چکیده:
Leibniz’s philosophy has been subject to many studies, but few have addressed aesthetic aspects of his theory. What Leibniz has written concerning aesthetic issues is scattered all through his works, and were we to understand his aesthetic ideas we must bring these dispersed parts together for explanation and interpretation. In the present paper, I attempted to extract Leibniz ideas pertaining to aesthetics, and to introduce, on their basis, a unified aesthetic theory of his, and demonstrate the importance of this theory for his epistemology. First, I brought into light Leibniz’s general ideas concerning aesthetics, and then, due to the epistemological-psychological significance of sense perception in Leibniz’s philosophy, I inquired into it in detail and attempted to clarify the place of sense (and aesthetic) knowledge in human knowledge according to Leibniz. Finally, in the last part, I ventured to divide Leibniz’s approach to sense (and aesthetic) qualities into objective and subjective aspects and investigated each separately.
خلاصه ماشینی:
But let us return to the treatise "Principles of Nature and Divine Grace"; there, before Leibniz speaks about music, he claims that "even sensory pleasure is convertible into a rational pleasure that is perceived vaguely," and then says the following about music: "Music enchants us, although its beauty lies only in the proportion of numbers and counting" (Leibniz, 1714: 641), thus, from the perception of the musical composite – unity in the multiplicity of notes and scales – an absolute affect is obtained, which is a sensory pleasure; however, there is also a rational pleasure in it that is obtained from the analysis of mathematical spatial distribution - although in the unconscious and vaguely -; therefore, the beauty that Leibniz refers to in this sentence is of the kind of beauty resulting from the intuition of forms seen in Plato, but it in no way negates the sensory beauty of music.
This concept is important in addressing Leibniz's aesthetics in several respects, which we will address in the following, and furthermore, in clauses b and c, we will show respectively how "what I do not know what it is" enters the realm of cognition and also what its relationship is with perception: a) First, he uses this concept to describe the experience of those mental qualities that are employed in aesthetic judgments; in his treatise "Meditations," he says: "Sometimes we see painters and other artists who judge correctly about the goodness or badness of a work; despite this, they often cannot provide a reason for their judgment, and if they are asked, they will say that this work, which is unpleasant, does not possess that 'thing which I do not know what it is'" .
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