چکیده:
Mulla Sadra does not accept the Peripatetic view regarding the spiritual emergence of the soul; instead, by proving substantial motion, he believes in the corporeality of the soul at the beginning of creation and its evolutionary motion. According to Sadra, what causes the perfection of the soul in the process of substantial evolutionary progress is the soul's perceptions, and every perception, by uniting with a level of the soul's ranks, grants it perfection. Allameh Tabataba'i does not accept the claim and proof of Sadr al-Muta'allihin regarding this issue and instead proposes a new way to present and prove it. From Allameh's perspective, the soul unites with the intellectual substance in the perception of universals, and this union is of the nature of the union of reality and subtlety. This research clarifies that accepting Allameh's view regarding the union of the soul with the intellectual substance is accompanied by numerous difficulties, and even if this union is accepted, it does not answer the relationship between the soul and the intelligibles and universal concepts, which is Mulla Sadra's fundamental issue. Furthermore, the precise formulation of the proof of conjunction (Burhan al-Tadayuf) in this research clarifies that some of Allameh's criticisms of this proof are valid, and the efforts of researchers and contemporaries to resolve these objections have been unsuccessful.
خلاصه ماشینی:
A Critical Analysis of Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabataba'i's Perspectives on the Issue of the Union of the Intellect and the Intelligible Fatemeh Moein-ed-Dini Alireza Kohansal , Seyyed Morteza Hosseini Shahrudi Abstract Mulla Sadra does not accept the Peripatetic view regarding the spiritual nature of the soul's origination; instead, through the proof of substantial motion, he believes in the corporeality of the soul at the beginning of creation and its evolutionary movement.
By looking at this historical evolution, it becomes clear that the disagreement regarding the issue of the union of the intellect and the intelligible lies in the issue of human knowledge of the non-self; and as Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Muta'allihin) himself has explicitly stated, there is no disagreement regarding God's knowledge of Himself, of creatures, and also the knowledge of every being unto its own essence (Sadr al-Muta'allihin 1981: vol.
Most of the responses in the aforementioned article to Allameh Tabataba'i's criticisms are based on the non-essentiality of the intelligible forms (Tavakoli and Saidi-Mehr 1392 a: 24-34), whereas Sadr al-Muta'allihin emphasizes this matter (Sadr al-Muta'allihin 1981: vol.
It might be said in response to Allameh's objection: Sadr al-Muta'allihin's intention from this phrase is not that the intelligible form is intelligible without having any knower, because as was explained in the second step of Sadra's argument, Sadr al-Muta'allihin himself was aware of this point that according to the rule of reciprocity (tadayuf), the intelligible necessarily requires a knower, but the intelligible does not necessarily need an external knower, and intelligible forms are their own knowers due to their abstraction from matter.
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