چکیده:
In 1980, van Fraassen published the book The Scientific Image in defense of empiricism and opposition to scientific realism. His claim is that the approach presented is an acceptable alternative to realism and that its acceptance carries fewer epistemological risks. The title he has chosen for his approach, namely constructive empiricism, indicates that in addition to adhering to empiricism, he has accepted an approach toward the structure of scientific theories that considers the presentation of scientific theories as a type of modeling and, consequently, invention rather than discovery. In the first part of the present article, this approach is briefly introduced, which includes introducing van Fraassen's approach to the structure of scientific theories, the components of empiricism effective in this approach, and also the arguments and reasoning presented against realism; then, an examination and critique of each of them is undertaken.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Rather, the surface of the expressions should be considered without interpretation; for example, if it is said in a scientific theory that there exist unobservable entities with certain properties called electrons in the world, this claim must be understood exactly as it arises from the surface of the expressions, and one should not seek to reduce the unobservable identity of the electron to observable matters.
In Van Fraassen's view, realists place excessive value on explanatory power and consider it more important than anything else; because there is always a reason to doubt the empirical adequacy of theories, and the scientist seeks explanation as a reassuring factor.
2. Critique and Review We have learned that Van Fraassen, as an anti-realist, has presented his approach in opposition to realism, but since he does not deny the existence of unobservable entities and has taken an agnostic stance toward them, he even believes that they might exist; Therefore, he cannot be considered an ontological anti-realist (1) , and also since by accepting the literal interpretation of theories he has accepted that it is possible for all scientific propositions to be characterized as true or false, he cannot be considered a semantic anti-realist (2) ; only because he considers the knowledge of unobservable entities to be beyond our empirical knowledge, and rejects the possibility of acquiring knowledge regarding this domain or justifying it, can he be classified among the epistemological anti-realists (3) .
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