چکیده:
The predicates of moral propositions are divided into two categories: value concepts (good and bad) and obligatory concepts (must, must not, and duty). This research aims to answer the fundamental question regarding the nature of the predicates of moral propositions using an analytical and critical method: what is the nature of these concepts from the perspective of Muslim scholars? Regarding the nature of value concepts (good and bad), the researcher Isfahani considers beauty and ugliness (husn and qubh) to be among the foundations of intellects and well-known matters; the researcher Khorasani considers good and bad to mean compatibility or incompatibility with the rational faculty; Allameh Tabataba'i considers them to be conventional (i'tibari); and Ostad Misbah Yazdi considers good and bad to mean compatibility or incompatibility with the desired perfection. Regarding the nature of obligatory concepts (must and must not), the researcher Isfahani believes that we do not have a concept called moral obligation or rational must/must not; Allameh Tabataba'i believes that the concept of 'must' is derived from the active faculty and its effect; and Ostad Misbah Yazdi states that obligatory concepts (must and must not) have two applications: informative and performative. The informative application means necessity by analogy, which expresses the real relationship between human voluntary actions and the desired goal of morality. However, it seems that the type of relationship for value concepts (beauty and ugliness) and obligatory concepts (must and must not), due to customary conventions, refers to the relationship of the human with their specific action; if accompanied by will, it is the same ratio of 'necessity by contingency' (darurat bil-ghayr) that the action acquires in terms of the attachment of the agent's will to it. In this case, moral necessity will be of the type of philosophical necessity, which describes external realities.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Regarding the nature of the value concepts of good and bad, Muhaqqiq Isfahani considers goodness and badness to be among the foundations of the rational (bina'at al-uqala) and well-known matters (mashhurat); Muhaqqiq Khorasani considers good and bad to mean compatibility or incompatibility with the rational faculty (al-quwwah al-aqilah); Allamah Tabataba'i considers them to be among the mental constructs (i'tibariyyat); and Professor Misbah Yazdi considers good and bad to mean compatibility or incompatibility with the desired perfection.
Professor Misbah Yazdi states that the obligatory concepts of ought and ought not have two applications: informative (akhbari) and performative (insha'i), where the informative application means necessity by analogy (darurat bi-l-qiyas), which expresses the real relationship between human voluntary actions and the desired goal of morality.
However, it seems that due to conventional understandings (irtikazat 'urfi), the type of relationship for both value-based moral concepts (goodness and badness) and obligatory concepts (ought and ought not) refers to the relationship of the human being with their specific action; if accompanied by will, the relationship is that same non-contingent necessity (darurat bi-l-ghayr) that the action possesses in terms of the attachment of the agent's will to it.
8. It seems that the type of relationship for value-based moral concepts of goodness and badness (husn and qubh) and the obligatory concepts of ought and ought-not, due to conventional understandings (irtikazat al-urfi), refers to the relationship of the human with their specific action; and if it is accompanied by will, the relationship is that same necessity by analogy (darurat bi al-ghayr) that the action possesses in terms of the attachment of the agent's will to it.
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