Defending Voluntarism Against Rival Views مقاله

خلاصه ماشینی:

Philosophers have expressed various opinions regarding the explanation of intentional action, but in the current context, the difference between these two actions can be explained according to our primary intuition as follows: an intentional action is an action that a person or agent performs by means of a reason and to achieve a specific goal; for example, this action of mine, where I go for a water bottle, pick it up, and drink it, is performed due to thirst and to alleviate it. 2. Davidson and the Elimination of Agent Causation Although Davidson (Davidson, 1963), like Anscombe, considers intentional action to be a central concept and believes that multiple descriptions can be provided for a specific action and that the rationalization of an action is performed by means of a reason, but in his view, we are not faced with multiple reasons and categories, but rather only with one reason which is interpreted as the primary reason consisting of belief and desire ; that is, by using the primary reason, all of Anscombe's categories can be explained and included under it. Of course, the reduction or elimination of intention does not mean that he at least does not believe in the mental states of belief and desire as the cause of action, but rather he is a defender of the token identity theory and does not consider mental properties to have causal effects.