چکیده:
The principle of innocence from fundamentalist jurists’ viewpoint is as a judgement for not proving the duty for the obligee in case that the principle of the duty is doubtful. Fundamentalist jurists have explained the general conduit of the principle of innocence as doubt in duty and they have considered it currently in all suspicions of sanctions and obligations, in contrast to the Akhbaris, they consider this principle to be current only in suspicions and obligations and also they are cautious in the face of suspicions of sanctions. Attention and contemplation in the view of the jurists in all time showed the evolution in the implementation and citation of this principle in the history of Imami jurisprudence. In the earlier periods of principled jurisprudence, the issue of the principle of innocence was discussed along with the issue of presence and debauchery, but in later periods fundamental jurists focused on these two separate aspects of the principle of innocence. The discussion of the presence and absence of the observer of the wisdom of things in terms of the primary titles has been related to the use of ijtihad arguments, but in contrast to the discussion of the principle of innocence and precaution, the observer of the judgment may doubt in the real judgment. In general, the authors in this paper studied this issue from the fundamentalist jurists’ viewpoint and contrasted it with other viewpoints.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Regarding these verses and the evidences for the authority of the principle of Bara'ah, Sheikh Ansari has said: These verses alone cannot - invalidate the view of the Akhbaris, which is based on the obligation of precaution; because the ultimate thing that can be derived from the verses is that as long as there is no specific or general evidence, whether legal or rational, regarding the obligation, the principle of Bara'ah is applied; however, if the Akhbaris present a rational or transmitted evidence for the obligation of precaution, for example, if an authentic narration states that in cases where the possibility of prohibition exists, precaution is necessary, these verses are not capable of contradicting it.
According to the view of Usuli jurists, the primary and essential condition for applying the principle of Bara'ah in ruling-based ambiguities is investigation and searching for the existence of a jurisprudential evidence; in this sense, whenever a jurist encounters a subject or an issue, in order to derive the legal ruling of that issue, he must first turn to jurisprudential evidences including the Book, Sunnah, Ijma (consensus), and Reason, and resolve his ambiguities through this path.
5- Conclusion The principle of Bara'ah is one of the four practical principles (jurisprudential evidences) and is among the most important of them; this principle, in the terminology of Usuli jurists and the science of Usul al-Fiqh, consists of ruling on the non-establishment of obligation for the mukallaf in a case where the existence of obligation is doubtful.
(
, 
, 
)
