چکیده:
The absolute non-existent paradox [- paradox] can be examined from two perspectives: research and educational. From a research perspective, it is important because it challenges propositions such as the impossibility of contradiction, circularity, and infinite regress, which form the foundation of our thought and knowledge. From an educational perspective, it is also significant because it has been addressed in two widely used textbooks, namely Bidayat al-Hikmah and Nihayat al-Hikmah, but very briefly and cursorily. This brevity and conciseness have been error-prone, confronting philosophy students with confusion and philosophy researchers with difficulty; to the extent that in a marginal note on Nihayat al-Hikmah, a thoughtful writer attributed 'disordered speech' to the late Allamah. In this writing, after the genealogy of the absolute non-existent paradox and enumerating the paradoxes that share its nature and destiny, I have clarified two points: A) Sadr al-Mutallahin, in his writings, has mentioned two methods for resolving this difficulty, where the expressions in Bidayah refer to one and the expressions in Nihayah refer to the other. Thus, the attribution of disordered speech is cleared from Allamah. B) Although Mulla Sadra considers these two methods to be his own innovation, these two are innovations of Mir Damad, whose lineage traces back to scholars such as Ijji, Taftazani, and Tusi.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Qadi Adud al-Din al-Iji, in al-Mawaqif, after explaining the philosophers' reasoning for proving mental existence, reports the problem that some have raised as follows: "That you said the subject of affirmative judgments must exist in the external world or in the mind.
Al-Iji writes that an anomaly arises when we express the proposition within the framework of a deviating affirmation: "The absolute non-existent is unknown and uninformable": because in this case, the implication of the proposition will be "the establishment of a thing for a thing," and in this state, the subject must have establishment.
But if we express the proposition in the structure of a positive negative and say: "The absolute non-existent is not known and not informable," no problem arises: because the positive negative is also true even with the negation of the subject (Jurjani, 2/172).
In explaining al-Iji's words, it must be said: whether a proposition is affirmative or negative, it requires the establishment of the subject, and from this perspective, there is no distinction between affirmatives and negatives: because an absolute judgment, whether negative or affirmative, depends on the conception of the subject, and conception necessitates mental existence.
" However, the statement of the logicians that a negative proposition is true even with the negation of the subject means that the subject can be non-existent in the context in which the predicate is negated, but not absolutely.
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