چکیده:
In descriptive terms, metaphors are widely used in scientific discourse, including scientific explanations. However, the fact that metaphorical explanations are justified explanations needs to be analyzed. According to the dominant approach, a justified scientific explanation must be both understanding-enhancing and true. The fundamental challenge regarding the truth of metaphorical explanations is that metaphorical propositions are considered false because they do not correspond to reality, while scientific explanations are expected to be true. In this study, we first show how metaphorical explanations enhance understanding using Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphors. Then, we argue how, in addition to understanding-enhancing, metaphorical explanations can be accepted as true according to this theory. The latter argument relies on the fact that understanding takes primacy over truth and often relies on metaphor. Finally, we attempt to refine and strengthen the position of the truth of metaphorical explanations through four paths that we have called argument from dead metaphors, argument from partial versus complete correspondence, argument from epistemic cost, and argument from curve fitting.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Philosophy of Science, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies Biannual Scientific Journal (Research Article), Vol. 14, No. 2, Autumn and Winter 2024 The Truth of Metaphorical Explanations in Light of Conceptual Metaphor Theory Ghasem Khabbazian * Seyyed Mohammad Mahdi Etemadolaslami ** Abstract In the capacity of description, metaphors are extensively used in scientific discourse, including scientific explanations.
The fundamental challenge regarding the truth of metaphorical explanations is that metaphorical propositions are considered false due to their lack of correspondence with reality; whereas it is expected that scientific explanations should be true.
Keywords: Conceptual metaphor theory, Lakoff and Johnson, scientific explanation, understanding, truth.
(Ghasem Khabazian and Seyed Mohammad Mehdi Etemad al-Islami) 149 In other words, we also consider explanations whose explanans provide a metaphorical description of the theoretical explanandum to be justified explanations (Mary Hesse, 1963).
The acceptance of metaphorical explanations as justified scientific explanations is at least conditional on fulfilling two basic criteria: understanding-enhancement and truth (Kitcher and Salmon, 1989).
In the second chapter of her book titled "how laws of physics lie", Cartwright relatively radically raises this claim that essentially the truth of an explanation conflicts with its degree of increased understanding; in her words, "truth, as much as 156 Philosophy of Science, Vol. 14, No. 2, Autumn and Winter 2024 is not explanatory".
If we consider metaphors to be false due to their lack of correspondence with reality, a significant portion of what is expressed in everyday life and in science would be false; however, as previously explained, metaphors, similar to models, perform an explanatory role through increased understanding.
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