چکیده:
Conception and assertion have always been considered as two basic and systematic parts of logic. The basis of two-partite logic is the discussion of conception and assertion; so, from the time of Avicenna until today, and according to the modern logic of the West, various issues have arisen in this regard. Two-partite logic is based on dividing the knowledge into knowledge by representation (ʿIlm Ḥuṣūlī) and knowledge by presence (ʿIlm Ḥuḍūrī). Given the nature of the division and the difference between the species, the issue of the relationship between conception and assertion is the most important of all these issues. The nature of this relation has a direct effect on the "logic of division", "dependence of one of them on the other", "possibility of the mental realization of each without the other," and other related issues. Avicenna, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and Mulla Sadra (in an independent work) are among the thinkers deliberated on this issue. The present article has reflected on analytical problems in the division of the knowledge by representation into conception and affirmation in the works of the three thinkers. So it aims to obtain the relationship between conception and assertion, the role of each one in achieving the other, and finally a comprehensive view of the three philosophers on the nature of conception and assertion. In this research, by separating the status of language (word) from the status of quiddity, the knowledge by representation has been explained and analyzed: in the status of quiddity, only assertion arises, and through the status of language and the relationship between language and thought, conception is obtained. If the knowledge by representation is of merely one core, logic will in fact be one-partite.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Logic Studies, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies A semi-annual scientific journal (Scientific-Research Article), Year 11, Issue 2, Autumn and Winter 2020, 31-63 A Critical Analysis of the Connection between Conception and Assent in Avicenna, Qutb al-Din al-Razi, and Mulla Sadra Zeynab Barkhordari * Ramin Roohi ** Abstract Conception and assent, as two fundamental and system-creating components in logic, have always been a subject of attention.
This article seeks to precisely recognize the conceptual and extensional relationship between conception and assent by relying on the views of three thinkers: Avicenna, Qutb al-Din al-Razi, and Mulla Sadra, so that through it, other issues that depend on this relationship can be analyzed and examined.
Mentioning a point here might draw the researcher's attention to Mulla Sadra's alertness, which is: Qutb al-Din al-Razi has presented this exact division in the commentary on Matali' al-Armawi, and it might be said that his final word in the discussion of dividing acquisitive knowledge into conception and assent is this very thing; however, his views in this regard are very divergent, and Mulla Sadra, in addition to using this same division, has subjected his views to criticism and review.
In fact, in this short and precise text, Ibn Sina claims four matters that, from the time of Ibn Sina until today, logicians have been embroiled in regarding these four claims, and today they are presented as four problems: The first problem: If we, according to Mulla Sadra's explanation and analysis, consider conception and assent to be two opposing types of the generic meaning of acquisitive knowledge, does precedence and posteriority arise between them?
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