چکیده:
The history of oil contracts in the last century indicates that oil contracts are a form of conflict between the interests of foreign oil companies and national interests of reservoir-owning governments. In this context, an important question arises for reservoir-owning governments as to which existing conventional upstream contracts should be chosen to maximize benefits. Representation theory has been used to answer this research question. In the designed model, each party's interest function in each of the upstream contracts is identified and modeled. Also, the rationality and motivation conditions in this model have been analyzed as participation constraints. The results of the proposed model using the genetic algorithm method show that, given field coordinates, the production-sharing contract has the lowest representation cost compared to the other two contracts of concession and service purchase. And as the selected model, production-sharing contracts can make the most profit for reservoir-owning governments.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Optimization of Upstream Oil and Gas Contracts: The Agent-Principal Model Agent - Principal Davood Manzoor, * Hojatollah Baramaki Yazdi, and Mohammad Saeed Shadkar * Received Date: 12/06/1397, Acceptance Date: 26/11/1398 Abstract The history of oil contracts in the last century tells that oil contracts are actually a manifestation of the conflict between the interests of foreign oil companies and the national interests of reservoir-owning states.
The results obtained from the proposed model using the genetic algorithm method indicate that the production sharing contract, compared to the concession and service contract, has the minimum agency cost in the assumed field coordinates and can be pursued as the selected model to bring the most benefit to the reservoir-owning government.
Relationship (2) is the utility function of the oil company (contractor) from the development of an oil field: Uc=( 1−τ−α)PQ−C−D (2) whose variables are as follows: P: Oil price per barrel τ: Tax rate α: Royalty rate Q: Number of barrels of oil produced over the entire life of the reservoir C: Exploration, development, and production cost D: Recovery cost.
As can be seen from Tables (1), (2), and (3), given the aforementioned assumptions for this model, the production sharing contract, while observing incentive conditions for the contractor to reduce agency costs and prevent moral hazards, will yield the highest benefit for both the reservoir owner government and the contracting company.
In the price range of 100 dollars per barrel of produced oil, given the aforementioned assumptions for this model, the production sharing contract, while observing incentive conditions for the contractor to reduce agency costs and prevent moral hazards, will yield the highest benefit for both the reservoir owner government and the contracting company.
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