چکیده:
Goodman was the first one who answered his own riddle of induction, although a relativist answer which opened a way for his constructivist ontological project. Realists, concerned with inductive knowledge, however, attempted to retrieve this kind of knowledge by attacking his answer and providing alternative answers to the riddle. Here I examine three reactions, by F. Jackson, C. Elder and P. Godfrey-Smith. This examination proceeds concentrating on the idea of natural kinds; whether this idea can open a (realist) way to deal with Goodman’s riddle? Jackson’s suggestion is examined borrowing Elder’s and Godfrey-Smith’s critics. Then I will go to Elder’s suggestion showing that it involves begging the question. Then Godfrey-Smith’s suggestion, which is indeed a reconstruction of Jackson’s idea that appealed to rules of statistical methodology instead of a philosophical conceptualization, is examined. This suggestion seems to me a prpoer idea to deal with Goodman’s riddle, on the on hand, and deeply relies on the idea of natural kinds, on the other. However, it is cannot disable Goodman’s own suggestion, which is also weaker metaphysically.
خلاصه ماشینی:
1. 2 Projectibility and the Naturalness of a Predicate An important consequence of Goodman's solution is that the goodness of an induction is independent of whether the predicate used in its inductive generalization refers to a natural property or type in the world.
In fact, if this solution works, it can be claimed that a good induction is constructed with predicates that refer to natural types, and this means an obstacle to Goodman's metaphysical project, or constructivism.
" (ibid: 116-117) He believes that in such a scenario, Goodman is forced to maximize the similarity between the strange inference and the seemingly flawless inference in all respects, except for the predicates they project, and such a thing briefly means that the theorist of the competing system must share with us all second-order beliefs regarding color (ibid: 117): For example, "aliens" might use color predicates in a way completely different from us, but at the same time, they must hold the same beliefs regarding colors that we do, and they must not derive from any premise that we do not accept; like us, they must assume that the color that objects of a kind have does not depend directly on what year of the calendar we are in, or does not depend merely on the event that those objects have been observed, or on the event that they were observed before such and such a calendar year.
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