چکیده:
One of the issues that various thinkers have always been engaged with is the attempt to prove the correct method for reaching a correct decision and, through it, an ideal political system. One of these attempts was made by Marquis Condorcet in support of democracy, which is known as Condorcet's Paradox. This paradox, which has a mathematical form, is based on the view that according to the law of large numbers, assuming a probability of over fifty percent for each individual to reach a correct decision, with an increase in the number of voters, the probability of a large group reaching a correct decision tends toward one hundred percent. However, Condorcet's paradox was based on assumptions that were gradually questioned until it was raised again in the 1950s. This coincided with the emergence of epistemic democracy thought, which led to the raising of new issues. The present article attempts to show, by examining different aspects of Condorcet's paradox, to what extent this paradox has been able to help solve the methodological and theoretical problems of this type of democracy. Our hypothesis is that proving two fundamental assumptions of Condorcet's paradox, under current conditions unlike in the past, shows that with the same law of large numbers, the majority are not necessarily immune to error, and correct decision-making is contingent upon the acceptance of fundamental principles and rules resulting from the free consultation of elites.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Our hypothesis is that the proof of two basic assumptions of Condorcet's theorem, in current conditions unlike in the past, shows that with the same law of large numbers, the majority is not necessarily immune to error, and correct decision-making is contingent upon the acceptance of fundamental principles and rules and the result of free consultation among elites.
Keywords : Condorcet's theorem, law of large numbers, epistemic democracy, deliberative democracy, jury theorem 8 Introduction One of the issues that humanity has long sought to solve is the problem of reaching a correct decision, both at the macro and micro levels, for policymaking.
In its classic form, this theorem is based on the rule that the majority of a group, most likely more than any individual member of that group, will choose the correct option between two decision-making options (McLean and Hewitt, 1994: 1).
According to critics, even in cases where decision-makers do not directly influence or affect one another, shared information and common causes link them to each other; B - Individuals do not have equal chances and probabilities of having the competence to reach the correct decision; C - The idea of "correctness 2" in decision-making during times of doubt may be meaningless in reality; D - The increasing size of the group is not evidence of that group reaching the correct decision; E - In the real world, decision-making is not necessarily conducted between only two options.
As follows from the theoretical discussion and the premise-based approach mentioned earlier, what is subject to debate in the Condorcet theorem is its two assumptions: first, that voters vote independently of one another, and second, that each of them has sufficient competence to distinguish a correct decision from an incorrect one.
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