چکیده:
In this article, the issue is examined that after long negotiations and consultations to resolve Iran's nuclear issue, the negotiating parties approved the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Following the approval of the JCPOA, fundamental and important issues are: what strategies the negotiating parties adopt in the post-JCPOA era, how and to what extent agreements and commitments are implemented, and ultimately, what the consequences of their realization or non-realization will be. The research question was posed as follows: based on game theory, what is the most optimal strategy in the post-JCPOA era for Iran and the United States? Furthermore, we proposed the hypothesis that according to game theory, post-JCPOA diplomacy between Iran and the United States can be designed as the most optimal decision by adopting a mutual cooperation strategy. Based on the evidence, documents, and findings of this research, we concluded that post-JCPOA nuclear diplomacy between Iran and the United States is a dynamic game with complete information and can be a positive-sum and win-win game. Then, the game tree of post-JCPOA nuclear diplomacy between Iran and the United States was drawn, and the options facing each of them were examined; subsequently, to find the answer and solve the game, the backward induction method was used, the result and Nash equilibrium of the game being that: 'lifting sanctions and adherence to mutual JCPOA commitments' will be the 'most appropriate' and 'most logical' strategy in the post-JCPOA era.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Then, the game tree of post-JCPOA nuclear diplomacy between Iran and America was drawn, and the options facing each of them were investigated; subsequently, to find the answer and solve the game, we used the backward induction method, the result and Nash equilibrium of which was that: the most logical and "most appropriate" strategy in the post-JCPOA era will be "lifting sanctions and mutual commitment to JCPOA obligations.
Given the assumptions of game theory, post-JCPOA diplomacy between Iran and America can be designed as a positive sum, by adopting mutual cooperation strategy as the most optimal decision.
Effort to resume negotiations and persuade the opposing party In the second branch, given the suspension of enrichment and the implementation of commitments by Iran, in the event of bad faith by the opposing party and the adoption of a non-cooperation strategy, the Iranian party, due to suffering losses and the high cost of restarting and returning nuclear facilities to their initial state, moves toward a less costly yet long-term strategy of attempting to resume negotiations and persuading the opposing party.
In decision node U3, the United States has three branches ahead: a nuclear Iran and continuation of sanctions with consequence (1+, 1+), choosing war and military conflict (transition and backward induction from node I2) with consequence (2-, 1+), and mutual commitment to the JCPOA after a period of turbulence with consequence (2+, 2+).
" Conclusion Given the hypothesis of this research, which, based on game theory, considered post-JCPOA diplomacy between Iran and the United States as a positive-sum game, adopting a mutual cooperation strategy is considered the most optimal decision.
(
, 
, 
)
