چکیده:
Quine's 1951 article titled 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' provides an unexpected critique of the famous analytic-synthetic dichotomy. While taking a stand against the use of the concept of analyticity in explaining and accounting for necessity and apriority, it deems any attempt to provide a non-circular distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions futile. According to Quine, concepts such as contradiction, synonymy, and meaning, which are used in defining analytic propositions, lack the necessary clarity and have a circular relationship with one another. Quine also argues that a holistic attitude toward the content of every individual statement will result in all propositions coming into contact with the empirical margins of our web of beliefs in some way, which means the possibility of revising all propositions and the disappearance of the familiar distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. This writing, while providing a detailed examination of Quine's view in denying the distinction, will ultimately discuss the most significant challenges facing this theory.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Analytic-Synthetic Distinction from Quine's Perspective Ghasem Pourhasan * Mojtaba Etemadinia** Abstract Quine's 1951 article titled "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," with an unexpected critique of the famous analytic-synthetic dichotomy, took a stand against the use of the concept of analyticity in explaining and clarifying necessity and apriority, and deemed any attempt to provide a non-circular distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions futile.
Quine also argues that a holist attitude toward the content of each individual statement will lead to all propositions coming into contact with the empirical fringes of our web of beliefs in some way, and this would mean the possibility of revising all propositions and the disappearance of the familiar distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions.
1. 3 The circularity of the definition of analytic propositions Quine's primary attack in the article "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction is directed against the notion of "synonymy" and "epistemic meaning of language," which is considered a Fregean criterion in the concept of analytic propositions (Rey, 2003).
3. 3 The meaninglessness of analytic propositions in a holist approach In continuation of his article "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," after rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction as "one of the non-empirical dogmas of empiricism" and as a "metaphysical belief" (ibid: 266), Quine moves on to the second dogma of empiricism, namely fundamental reductionism, according to which every meaningful judgment is, ultimately, reducible to an unmediated sensory experience.
In this regard, Quine defines so-called analytic propositions based on the concept of synonymy, according to which, in such propositions, understanding the meaning of the words used in them will reveal their truth (Gellis, 1387: 135).
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