چکیده:
The problem of induction is one of the most important and difficult philosophical issues, the resolution of which would solve many philosophical dilemmas and make scientific inferences justifiable. Bertrand Russell, one of the great analytical philosophers of the twentieth century, has attempted to solve the problem of induction. From Russell's perspective, the problem of induction is a question of how general judgments, causal laws, and indirect knowledge are justified. He does not consider recourse to the principle of the uniformity of nature sufficient to solve this problem; in his view, the framework of work is the acceptance of the principle of induction. According to the principle of induction, the greater the number of instances of the conjunction of A with B, the greater the probability of the permanent conjunction of A with B, and whenever the number of instances of conjunction is sufficient, the probability of the permanent conjunction of A with B becomes near certainty. According to Russell, the principle of induction is neither empirically provable nor rationally provable; rather, this principle must be accepted based on its inherent self-evidence and, ultimately, because of its consequences. In Russell's opinion, extra-logical principles or the five postulates cause the probability of generalization to approach certainty. Finally, Russell notes that although induction does not provide us with theoretical (logical and mathematical) certainty, the near certainty resulting from it is greater than the certainty resulting from metaphysical dogmatism.
خلاصه ماشینی:
His answer to the problem of induction is important from several aspects: a) Russell considers induction to be one of the most difficult problems in philosophy and believes that induction is very influential and important in the problem of epistemology (Russell, 1914: 43; Russell, 1927: 14); b) the acceptance of the principle of induction, from Russell's perspective, is the basis for solving many philosophical dilemmas, including causality; c) Russell's position regarding induction has had a great influence on the Vienna Circle and its views (Gillespie, 1381: 38); d) more importantly, according to Russell, the problem of induction is not refutable or provable by relying on experience itself; proving induction through experience entails a circular argument.
Philosophy of Science, Year Two, Number One, Spring and Summer 2012 Thus, like Hume, Russell believes that such expectations only justify the common public belief in a uniformity of the occurrence of matters, but they do not provide any logical evidence for belief in the future or even for the belief in the expectation of the continuation of this experienced uniformity; because this very belief is among those universal laws that require proof.
4. The Principle of Induction Up to this point, Russell's argument is actually the same as Hume's argument regarding induction, based on the idea that mere uniformity in the occurrence of past matters and the repeated conjunction of two matters does not justify universal laws and causal laws, but Russell, unlike Hume, does not stop here, but rather goes further Philosophy of Science, Year Two, Number One, Spring and Summer 2012 goes further and considers the solution to be in the application of the principle of induction (the principle of induction).
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