چکیده:
The subject of this article is to examine the role of institutions and governing structures in a country on the type and manner of the impact of oil revenues on the economic growth and development of oil-exporting countries. The fundamental question is whether natural resources such as oil inherently cause a reduction in economic growth and the emergence of a curse in a country, or whether it is the prevailing institutional-structural framework in a country and the interaction between this framework and the rent derived from oil resources that determines whether oil will be a curse or a blessing for a country; the methodology of the present study is based on panel econometric models based on information from the period 1980 to 2007 for 23 important oil-exporting countries. The main hypothesis of the research is that the key and determining variable in converting the rent derived from oil resources into a curse or a blessing is the quality of the institutions prevailing in oil-exporting countries. In fact, the phenomenon of the resource curse occurs in countries where their institutional quality index is lower than a threshold for this institutional index, and the results of the present study confirm this hypothesis. Furthermore, Iran's institutional quality index has been lower than the aforementioned threshold, and oil resources have likely been a curse in Iran.
خلاصه ماشینی:
The fundamental question is whether natural resources like oil inherently cause a decrease in economic growth and the emergence of a curse in a country, or whether it is the prevailing institutional-structural framework in a country and the interaction between this framework and the rent derived from oil resources that determines whether oil will be a curse or a blessing for a country; the methodology of the present study is based on panel econometric models using data from the period 1980 to 2007 for major oil-exporting countries.
Based on the empirical results of the research, the probability of the occurrence of the weak version of the resource curse phenomenon, which states that an increase in oil rent reduces non-oil economic growth, is very high in countries where their institutional-structural quality index is below the threshold (55).
Based on these results, the strong version of the resource curse, which states that an increase in oil rent reduces total economic growth, is not confirmed in countries where their institutional-structural quality index is below the threshold (45).
Accordingly, in countries where their institutional-structural framework quality index is below the threshold, the weak version of the resource curse, which states that an increase in oil revenues will reduce non-oil economic growth, is confirmed.
Accordingly, in countries where their institutional-structural framework quality index is below the threshold, the strong version of the resource curse, which states that an increase in oil revenues will reduce total economic growth, is not confirmed.
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