چکیده:
Christian philosophers pay special attention to the issue of evil; they face an argument such as this: 1- God is the creator of all beings; 2- Evil exists; therefore, God is the creator of evil. To solve this problem, he first divides evil into two types: natural evil and moral evil, and attempts to attack the second premise in each of these two evils. Aquinas initially shows that although evil is real, it is not a substance, and all beings—insofar as they exist—are good; however, all have deficiencies relative to absolute perfection, and these deficiencies and limitations become the cause of evil; but the creation of the world, with all its deficiencies, is ultimately good, and God has willed the good of the totality of the universe—which is accompanied by these deficiencies. Regarding moral evils, after an analysis of their meaning, we finally see that these evils stem from human free will; however, based on His wisdom, God has created humans as free beings so that they may attain goods that would otherwise not have been possible for them, even though the existence of this free will necessitates that an individual can commit errors. What constitutes evil, of course, is not the choice and will of the human, but rather the failure of the will to act according to reason and divine law, which leads to moral error. Ultimately, Aquinas shows that God—who is absolute good—cannot be the cause of evils, whether moral or natural.
خلاصه ماشینی:
It is clear that the problem of evil does not grapple with every conception of God; attributing good and evil to God, without considering the discussion of divine will, is not very compelling, and in fact, the discussion of evil as an argument against the existence of God targets the existence of a God who knows, can, and wants to create good, and these imply the knowledge, power, and benevolence of God. An impersonal God, as observed in some religions and sects, lacks the characteristics that provide the ground for such a discussion, and likewise, a personal non-anthropomorphic God does not provide sufficient ground for such a discussion.
In response, Aquinas sees the cause of distinction in moral matters as being in the will and choice; however, it is reason that serves as the moral criterion to determine whether his intended goals have been met or not, and this is the source of our judgment as to whether a moral act is good or evil.
33 God's being the cause of moral evils presents an even greater problem; because unlike natural evils, one cannot speak of other goods and benefits of a different kind; apparently, here nothing exists except harm; of course, God is the cause of all our voluntary acts, even when we decide to sin; because sin itself is a thing and, like all other real things, is a creature; but from Aquinas's perspective, God is not the cause of this evil; because first, sinning has no meaning for God; rather, this concept can only be applied to humans; just as, for example, can God make a bed?
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