چکیده:
In this essay, first, by examining the division of intellect into theoretical and practical and the division of wisdom into theoretical and practical, two theories on this matter are presented. According to the first theory (Avicenna's theory), the divider of wisdom into theoretical and practical is the theoretical intellect; according to the second theory, practical wisdom is the object of the practical intellect, and theoretical wisdom is the object of the theoretical intellect. In the discussion of the relationship between realities and conventional matters, the subject of theoretical and practical wisdom is addressed; then, considering the division of knowledge into conception and assent, and considering each as real or conventional, four types of relationships are considered, and it is acknowledged that the main discussion lies in the relationship between real assent and conventional assent; then, in explaining this relationship, two theories are examined: the first theory is the theory of Allameh Tabataba'i and Professor Motahhari, who argue for the absence of a productive relationship and logical inference between them. The second theory is the theory of most jurists and some philosophers, who consider demonstration to be applicable in conventional matters and believe in a relationship between reality and convention.
خلاصه ماشینی:
At the end of this section, it might not be useless to mention one possibility, which is that according to the basis of the Sheikh al-Ra'is (Avicenna) in dividing reason into theoretical and practical, the essential difference between the two, and also the classification of theoretical reason for the types of wisdom, it seems that conventional concepts in the sense of mere tools and conventions belong to practical reason, which is used as a means in managing particular affairs, without having a perceptual nature; however, other conventional matters—which in the terminology of jurists possess nafs al-amr (objective reality) and intrinsic benefit or harm, such as Sharia commands and prohibitions or moral concepts—fall within the scope and domain of practical wisdom; therefore, there is no logical or perceptual relationship between theoretical and practical reason, and consequently, purely instrumental conventional matters are also outside the subject of dispute.
It seems that the synthesis of these two points is that metaphorical and conventional attribution between two types of thought is based on the real conception of subject and predicate; meaning that mental activity in the realm of conventional propositions does not occur in a vacuum; rather, its raw materials are obtained from the external world; therefore, when someone says "Zaid is a lion," they conventionally attribute the concept of an existing entity to another existing entity; but the concepts of this sentence and the conception of subject and predicate are real and actual, and the convention lies solely in the realm of attribution and assent; and in the world of convention, we merely perform a non-real transfer of real conceptions rather than creating new concepts; because according to philosophical arguments, a human being cannot create concepts from themselves without any prior background; rather, all conceptions are reflections of the real world within the perceiving faculty; therefore, by taking real conceptions from the outside, a human being creates relationships between them based on purposes, similarities, and connections, the result of which is the construction of conventional matters, and these conventional matters—which I have named conventional propositions—are based on truths, i.
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