چکیده:
In this article, James Rachels proceeds to explain, elucidate, and critique two theories: psychological egoism and ethical egoism. In the first section, after stating and arguing for psychological egoism—to the effect that even actions that appear to be self-sacrificing are actually driven by the agents' own desires—he writes that to label an action as selfish, one must use the object of the desire, rather than the person themselves, as the criterion. He then goes on to identify the deepest flaw of the aforementioned theory as its unfalsifiability. In the second section, he examines and critiques three arguments made in favor of ethical egoism, which are respectively: this theory shows the best way to serve the interests of others; it is the only moral philosophy that values individual personhood and provides the best explanation for human moral actions. He then addresses three arguments made against this theory, which are: this theory is unable to resolve conflicts of interest among humans, which is a prerequisite for any moral theory; it entails logical contradiction or internal inconsistency; and finally, it necessitates the irrational and unjustified preference of one's own interests over the interests of others. Rachels critiques the first two arguments and accepts the third. Real between them.
خلاصه ماشینی:
There was once a theory about human nature that was accepted by many philosophers, psychologists, and economists, and many ordinary people still accept it, which says that we humans do not have the ability and talent for self-sacrifice; therefore, the theory—known as psychological egoism—states that every person is created in such a way that they pursue their own interests; therefore, expecting altruistic or philanthropic behavior from humans is unreasonable.
In response to the question "Is self-sacrifice possible?", we are tempted to give an answer like this: Of course; humans sometimes practice self-sacrifice; Jones does not go to see his favorite movie so that he can spend the cinema money on helping the hungry; Brown spends his free time doing volunteer work in a hospital; Smith rushes into a burning house to save a child; these are all instances of self-sacrifice, and if a proponent of psychological egoism thinks that such cases do not occur, they are mistaken.
If psychological egoism is true, then with a more general explanation regarding human motives, this theory must, once and for all prove; that is, the very thing Hobbes seeks to accomplish.
In such cases, the aforementioned duty cannot be inferred from the principle of ethical egoism; thus, it seems that all moral duties cannot be derived and explained from the principle of self-interest.