چکیده:
In al-Suhrawardi's philosophy, there is a fundamental turn in the attitude towards the secondary intelligible. Mulla Sadra examines Suhrawardi's views on intelligibles, especially philosophical secondary intelligible, and takes them into a new system, and so far there is a popular opinion about these intelligibles. In the commentaries of philosophical books, Motahhari has made this discussion explained completely and expressed implications, and he has used this topic in his critiques of Marxism. In this article, while comparing the views of Master Motahhari and al-Suhrawardi, we intend to establish a dialogue between these two thinkers and specially to examine the objections of Master to al-Suhrawardi. In this way, the intellectual framework (paradigm) of al-Suhrawardi and Motahhari should be considered in the secondary intelligible, and in transferring concepts from any approach to another, its implications should also be transferred. It seems that according to al-Suhrawardi's approach, Motahhari's objections not acceptable, but Suhrawardi invalidates the opposite opinion due to the occurrence of a circle paralogism of in it.
خلاصه ماشینی:
com Date of Receipt: 2022/06/10 Date of Approval: 2022/08/16 Introduction The discussion of philosophical second intelligibles, as Professor Motahhari has mentioned time and again in his works, is a key and vital discussion in philosophy and science because it brings the issue of objectivity into play.
As one of the contemporary researchers has shown, "Suhrawardi considered all philosophical concepts to be entirely mental and has not attributed to them any status of an abstract source in the external world, even in terms of objectivity with the subject" (Esmaeili, 2011, p.
). In continuation, he says: "In any case, the dilemma that exists here is that we can only consider something as knowledge for ourselves, trust it, and grant it validity if our mind has reached it through a criterion and in a certain way and manner to their mental accidentality, but their predication is external, and they are second philosophical intelligibles (Tabataba'i, 1417 AH, p.
Just as Professor Motahhari was criticized that if second philosophical universals do not exist, the objectivity of sciences would be called into question, one can also criticize the Sheikh of Illumination here: if we do not accept the non-substantiality of specific forms, how else can we speak of the permanent and constant accidents of a thing?
Alongside this current, Suhrawardi holds a completely different view: he believes that all general concepts are mental and conventional, and in modern terms, the philosophical second intelligible does not exist.
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