چکیده:
One of the important conditions for strengthening and stabilizing the two sciences of Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh is a correct understanding of the opinions and theoretical views of the theorists in these two sciences, which is achieved better and more accurately through comparison and matching between them. In this writing, to introduce the innovations of Mirza Na'ini and Imam Khomeini as two great contemporary jurists in the science of Usul al-Fiqh, the author has addressed the comparison and assessment of their views in this science.
خلاصه ماشینی:
(Anwar al-Hidaya, 1/349) Under the discussion of 'insidad' (blocking), which he addressed only to the extent of necessity and refrained from the detailed elaborations of others like Sheikh Ansari, Imam Khomeini writes: "It is hoped that students of knowledge and scholars of Usul recognize the value of their noble lives and times, set aside principled discussions that lack jurisprudential fruit, and devote their high aspirations to useful and beneficial matters; one should not fall into the illusion that there is scientific benefit in such discussions and details.
The Imam, regarding whether a command for something necessitates the prohibition of its opposite, (Manahij al-Wusul, 2/27) and in the discussion of the permissibility of a command while its condition is absent (ibid, 2/60), and in investigating the binding nature (tanjiz) of global knowledge (ilm ijmali) when the possibility of testing one side of it is removed (Anwar al-Hidayah, 2/215), he proceeds to explain and describe legal discourses, the presentation of which is beyond the scope of this writing and requires independent investigation and authorship.
Na'ini (Fawa'id al-Usul, 2/377 and 393), by bringing the issue to the chapter of conflict (tazahum) based on accepting the theory of the order of difficulty in a mandatory act when the more important one is being abandoned, resolves the matter in this field; however, the Imam, by establishing legal discourses, proves and provides evidence for the belief that a command for something in general legal duties does not necessitate the non-command of its opposite or the prohibition of its opposite (Manahij al-Wusul, 2/30), contrary to the theory of others such as Sheikh Baha'i (pp.
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