چکیده:
In this writing, the author examines and critiques Mulla Sadra's theory regarding the perception and connection of the world with the known. In principle, the description and praise of Transcendent Philosophy should not be regarded as implying its uncriticizability and immunity from any error, nor does it mean that all components of Transcendent Philosophy are vulnerable. The present research conveys the meaning that some of Mulla Sadra's views are not free from ambiguity and criticism, one of which is his theory regarding the perception and connection of the world with the known. The author has attempted to transparently provide reasoning for Akhund's perspective in this regard and, if a suitable justification within philosophy is not found, to express the point of weakness and the reason for its incompleteness.
خلاصه ماشینی:
B) The known by essence, whether universal or particular, is the form resulting from the thing in the knower, and its relationship with the knower is the relationship of an accident to the subject; because the rational soul itself, or one of its perceptive faculties, is the locus, and is independent of the form currently obtained (Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Sharh al-Isharat, 2/308-310).
From Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Muta'allihin), various expressions have been reached in this regard, such as: The soul, in relation to imaginary and sensory forms (particular perceptive forms), is an innovative agent (fa'il mubdi') and is closer to an agent than to a recipient (mahall qabil); however, in relation to intellectual forms—of various types of originated beings and intelligibles—it is a mere Illuminationist addition, which for it, occurs in relation to abstract luminous essences existing in the world of intellects; and during the perception of universal intelligibles, it observes abstract intellectual essences, and on the other hand, it also claims the absolute union of the perceiver with the perceived.
First expression: Sadr al-Muta'allihin writes: "The soul, in relation to imaginary and sensory (particular) perceptions, is an innovative agent (fa'il mubdi'), and they exist through the soul's creation rather than its reception; their subsistence in the soul is not like the subsistence of accidents in subjects or forms in matter, but rather like the subsistence of an action in an agent, and the soul has a subsistence with those forms that is a subsistence of ontological sustenance (ma'iyyat qayyumi), much like the ontological sustenance of the Exalted Necessary Being with His action" (Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi, Mafatih al-Ghayb, p.
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