چکیده:
The name and fame of Sahib al-Fusul and his innovative views cannot be unknown or obscure to those familiar with the science of Usul. He, who is always remembered by the name of his great work (al-Fusul), has presented new and wonderful theories and opinions in this valuable book, not only within the scope of the science of Usul but also in the fields of literature, logic, and theology, which in his era were intertwined with fundamental issues. His well-known scientific personality and the depth and solidity of his thoughts have influenced all the Usuli thinkers after him and prompted them to take positions and engage in criticism. The present writing attempts to explain the most important innovative views of this profound and theoretical Usuli thinker in the field of the science of Usul, and to critique and examine the perspectives of other renowned Usulis in this regard.
خلاصه ماشینی:
In response to the objection that in a number of legal rules and discussions, the debate is about the establishment or non-establishment of a rule rather than its evidentiary nature—such as the discussion of the obligatory مقدمه (preliminary) or the discussion of the ضد (counter-action), where the debate is about the establishment or non-establishment of the correlation between the obligation of the preliminary and the obligation of the thing requiring it, or the obligation of something and the prohibition of its counter-action—he says: "The return of these discussions is also to the discussion of evidentiary nature, and in fact, the discussion is whether the command to something is evidence for the obligation of its preliminary or the prohibition of its counter-action or not?" He then considers this view to be close to the famous view of the predecessors, who consider the four evidences to be the subject of the science of Usul, and in an attempt to reconcile the views of the predecessors and the later scholars, he says: "The reason why the predecessors restricted the subject of the science of Usul to the four evidences was that they had realized, according to their scientific intuition, that this science discusses inferential and jurisprudential rules and general evidences; and since these evidences, in their view, were limited to the scope of these four evidences—which are actually the primary tools of jurisprudential reasoning—they therefore placed the subject of the science of Usul exclusively as the four evidences.
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