چکیده:
The most important part in analyzing moral concepts includes those used as predicate in moral sentences covering moral concepts of valuation and obligation. Moral concepts in the field of values include those like “good” and “bad” while obligatory concepts include “ought to” and “ought no” and “duty”. Many papers have been written about “moral obligation”; however, dissociating the area of semantics from ontology of the concept of “moral obligation”, this paper has proposed a new interpretation of Allame Tabatabaie’s viewpoint about semantics of “moral obligation”. This study intends to prove that for Allame Tabatabaie, the meaning of “moral obligation” is known as “necessity by the other” because he founds i’tibaryat theory based on “Sakkaki`s view” and there is no distinction between literal meanings of these kinds of metaphors from their real meanings, but figurative meanings are different from real meanings. Therefore, the meaning of “ought to” would not be different in real and credit usages and according to the fact that from his viewpoint the meaning of “real ought to” is “necessity by the other”; thus, the meaning of “credit ought to” will be “necessity by the other”, too
خلاصه ماشینی:
" This research, by distinguishing the semantic aspect from the ontological aspect of the concept of "moral obligation," provides a new interpretation from Allameh's perspective regarding the semantics of "moral obligation" and seeks to prove that Allameh considers the meaning of "moral obligation" to be "necessity by another" (darurat bi-al-ghayr); because he establishes the theory of conventionality (i'tibariyyat) based on "Sakkaki's metaphor" (majaz-e Sakkaki), in which the meaning of the word in such metaphors does not differ from its real meaning; rather, the metaphorical instance will be different from the real instance; therefore, the meaning of "ought" in real and conventional usage will not have a difference, and given that the meaning of "real ought" from his perspective is "necessity by another," the meaning of "conventional ought" will also be "necessity by another.
This research seeks, from a semantic dimension, to answer the question: what is the meaning of "moral obligation" from the perspective of Allameh Tabataba'i?
Some philosophers of ethics have used the term "moral ought" instead of "moral obligation" concepts, which seems to be to avoid certain confusions, such as some people paying attention to the literal meaning of "obligation" (ilzam) and concluding that sentences containing "obligatory concepts" are performative (insha'i); therefore, sometimes the author of the present writing uses the term "moral ought" so that "moral obligation" is not mistakenly taken to mean the "performance of necessity" and the performative nature of such sentences is not considered.
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