Reason and Decision: Central Teachings of Weber and Value Choices مقاله

خلاصه ماشینی:

According to Luther, I do not know how one can justify that someone who is aware of the predominantly bad effects and consequences of an action and yet commits it, can be considered to have "good intentions"; and for this reason, and contrary to Weber's view, the consideration of results is precisely related to the choices of the "intentionalist" individual. Here we will omit the details of the matter and merely suffice with reminding that Weber, in order to formulate the problem, had to formulate the problem of choice based on a priori assumptions solely in terms of values, because formulating the problem in terms of a priori assumptions would generally call into question the rationality of his a priori assumptions regarding the possibility of causal knowledge, as we will see his critics in the Weimar period raised. When he uses this word, he has in mind a meaning of the nature of rationality or reason that is distinctly different from Weber's view on this matter, and consequently, Weber's argument and Strauss's objection each follow their own path. Concepts such as justice, consensual judgment, and fairness can be interpreted in different ways: one considers them components of natural law; another, which follows the school of pragmatism, regards them as parts of the assumptions of political action that have been completely tested and discarded in political experiences; and another views them as elements of a seemingly valid moral and political tradition that should not be set aside without a convincing reason.