Science, Rationality, and the Lack of a Common Ground مقاله

خلاصه ماشینی:

We have referred to multiple forms of hermeneutics: the importance and role of tradition in human understanding; the recognition that different traditions or forms of life may be incommensurable, yet can be compared in a rational way; gaining awareness of the close link between understanding and interpretation, and the essential role of practical judgment in performing such comparisons; familiarity with the belief that studying non-native and foreign phenomena can create a specific dialectical dialogue through which we can achieve a deeper and more critical understanding of our own forms of life and even expose our own prejudices. This corresponds to Kuhn's claim that the "common" criteria shared by scientists are so open that they require interpretation and a judicious testing of alternatives at times when specific choices must be made among competing theories and paradigms. Turning away from a model of rationality that seeks specific rules to serve as necessary and sufficient conditions, and turning toward a model of practical rationality that emphasizes the role of exemplars (examples) and judgmental interpretation, is not only a characteristic of the choice of theory but is the dominant theme that has captivated all of Kuhn's thought regarding science. Kuhn's constant attacks on the concept of using a program for theory selection, his criticism of the concept of a neutral and unchanging observational language, and his effort to undermine the foundation of the concept of a specific set of scientific criteria that can act as necessary and sufficient rules or conditions for resolving scientific disputes, can all be interpreted as questioning Cartesian anxiety.