چکیده:
It is declared invalid, and in the third section, a general critique of theology is presented, which deals with explaining the divisions of theology and critiquing them. Kant's way of confronting religion is similar to his way of confronting cognition and knowledge; in dealing with cognition, Kant essentially engages in its critique such that his philosophy becomes famous for critique. This process is followed in the realm of religion as well, and in fact, the first and most fundamental thing Kant does is the critique of religion. Of course, since he considers religion to belong to the realm of practical reason, he does not rely solely on the critique of religion and himself presents a model of the religion and religiosity he intends, albeit incompletely. In this approach, he has accepted a great deal of influence from Hume, as he himself confesses. Kant says: 'I openly admit that it was David Hume who first, many years ago, awakened me from my dogmatic slumber and gave direction to my researches in the realm of theoretical philosophy.' He is, of course, aware of the point that 'religion, by virtue of its sanctity... usually seeks to withdraw itself from criticism. (But regardless) our era is an era of criticism and everything must be subject to it.' In this writing, Kant's critique of religion is examined in three parts. In the first part, the discussion of religion and cognition will be addressed. Kant claims that theoretical knowledge of God is impossible because the only capital of theoretical knowledge is the power of experience and sensation, which has no way regarding God. In the second part, his critique of the proofs for the existence of God is briefly presented. Kant summarizes all proofs into three categories and rejects all three because they ultimately end in a purely mental entity.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Therefore, in the absence of any determination, nothing remains except the concept of something non-sensible, which contains the return of the meaning of the sensible world, but no knowledge (no expansion of the concept) of its inner nature is provided"41 In other words, and emphasizing the mode of theoretical cognition, we must say that "all principles of understanding have an internal application, but for the cognition of a being, the highest transcendental application of the principles of understanding is desired, yet the understanding is in no way equipped for such a task"51 But departing from nature, transcending every kind of possible experience, and drowning in pure conceptions may trap us in this erroneous conception that "we can no longer say that objects are incomprehensible to us and that nature confronts us with unsolvable problems has created, because there, we are never confronted with nature or known objects, but merely with concepts whose origin is exclusively in our reason, and we deal with mental existents from which all problems arising from their concept should be solvable"61 and in fact, we are trapped in the world of ideas, but we "are not allowed to use our intellectual concepts, that is, intellectual concepts which we have as a formal cause without the mediation of the will, in a transcendental manner to constitute the divine essence according to these concepts with specific attributes that have always been taken exclusively from human nature, and thus wander ourselves in raw and foolish concepts"71 A noteworthy point that appears in the recent expression is that the immersion of reason to discover divine attributes is actually a type of anthropomorphic cognition, and this type of cognition is essentially a kind of analogy arising from the comparison of God's attributes with human attributes.
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