چکیده:
Sartre considers himself neither a realist nor an idealist. As a phenomenologist, on one hand, he believes that there is no reality called the noumenon behind phenomena, and on the other hand, he does not consider phenomena to be dependent on consciousness or a knowing subject. Phenomena are their own foundation. Thus, we are faced with two types of being: one is consciousness and the other is the objects of consciousness or phenomena. Sartre calls the first type "being-for-itself" and the second type "being-in-itself." In his view, being-in-itself has three main characteristics: 1- It is, 2- It is in itself, 3- It is what it is. In this article, first, Sartre's phenomenological approach—based on which he divides being into two fundamental types—is explained, and then the three main characteristics of being-in-itself are described.
خلاصه ماشینی:
This necessity that consciousness must always be consciousness of something other than itself, and this complete escape from self, is what Sartre calls intentionality.
Husserl had set aside the issue of the external existence of the object of consciousness as an insignificant matter, but Sartre does not set it aside so easily; rather, he believes that the phenomenon has a real and concrete existence.
As a phenomenologist, Sartre does not accept the noumenon as a reality that lies behind the phenomena; yet, at the same time, he does not reduce the existence of phenomena to mere appearing and being perceived.
As a phenomenologist, on one hand, he believes that no reality called noumenon lies behind phenomena or appearances, and on the other hand, he does not consider phenomena to be dependent on consciousness or the knowing subject.
In this article, first, Sartre's phenomenological approach - based on which he divides being into two fundamental types - is explained, and then the three main characteristics of being-in-itself are described.
A thing, ______________________________ Collins says that what Sartre says in Being and Nothingness about this is merely a philosophical expression of the feeling that the protagonist of the story gets in Nausea from encountering the world.
For this reason, according to Sartre, the fact that consciousness requires a being other than itself shows that such a being exists, whereas the ontological proofs of Anselm and Descartes cannot prove the existence of God. See: (Catalano, 1980: 39) References 1- catalano, Joseph, A commentary on Jean - Paul Sartre''''s "Being and Nothingness", Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980.
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