چکیده:
The issue of the connection between moral judgments and reality is one of the important issues in moral philosophy. A group, which constitutes the majority of Western moral philosophers, has worked to deny it, while another group has accepted it. In this article, by presenting criticisms and the incorrect consequences of denying the relationship between ethics and reality on their connection, emphasis is placed on this matter. The most important consequence of denying the relationship between the two is the issue of moral relativism and, consequently, the denial of any discussion or exchange of views regarding it; something that no scholar with a stated position actually adheres to in practice. Another important consequence of denying the aforementioned relationship is the constructivism of moral judgments, which in turn entails many unacceptable consequences. From the author's perspective, moral propositions are necessary, and their necessity is derived from observing the impact of the moral act on the perfection of its agent; this theory can be indirectly derived from the sayings of all moral philosophers who consider the moral act to be purposeful.
خلاصه ماشینی:
The fundamental questions raised in this regard are as follows: Are moral obligations, such as one must tell the truth or must not lie, objective truths that exist outside the mind and the feelings of the speaker; or are they mental matters that, although indirectly reflect the external world; or are they mental matters that have no external reflection at all, meaning they are conventional?
Is external reality and objectivity, or what pertains to it, the origin of the emergence of moral judgments, or is it subjectivity, feelings, tastes, and ultimately the conventions related to the speaker that cause their emergence?
D - Moral concepts and propositions, whatever their nature may be, whether objective or subjective, even if they express human inner feelings and emotions, are still cognizable; because if these concepts are of the type of philosophical concepts, they fall within the domain of philosophical cognition, and if they are like logical concepts or even like conventional concepts or expressions of emotions, they are still identifiable within the domain of those same concepts.
Now, in light of what has been said, we will explain moral predicates: If it is said that truthfulness is good, self-sacrifice is desirable, forgiveness is beautiful, and the opposite concepts are bad, it means that truthfulness is suitable for human goals, and the same applies to self-sacrifice and forgiveness.
Thus, the answer to the second question is that the subject, predicate, and relationship of moral propositions are real matters and not conventional ones.
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