چکیده:
In examining the meaning of a predicate, three important theses in Frege's theory emerge: 1- The mode of presentation of the referent included in the meaning of the expression. Thus, the meaning of a predicate includes the mode of presentation of the concept as the referent of the predicate. 2- The meaning of a predicate is unsaturated. 3- The meaning of a predicate is a part of the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs. In examining the most important interpretations surrounding the meaning of the predicate in Frege's theory, each interpretation undermines at least one of the above theses. Dummett and Clement also provide specific interpretations regarding the non-saturation of the meaning of the predicate, both of which are inconsistent with the apparent wording of Frege. In general, it seems that a suitable explanation cannot be provided in this field such that all three aforementioned theses are compatible.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Although Frege has spoken and provided explanations regarding the sense and referent of proper names and declarative sentences in many places, he does not provide much explanation regarding the sense of a function and the sense of a predicate, and this very matter has caused various interpretations of the sense of a predicate to be presented by commentators of his works.
In the example he mentions (Clement, 2000: 1), he says: according to Frege, two predicates "x has a heart" and "x has a kidney" have one reference, meaning they denote one concept, although they have two different senses.
" We observe that both in the case of the sense of proper names and the sense of declarative sentences, the aforementioned logical structure is of a function-argument type, and upon the saturation of the function in question, the intended reference is obtained as the value of that function and is, in fact, introduced.
Now, regarding the predicate, if we consider its sense to be a function, on one hand, according to the interpretation mentioned above, this function is a function from the sense of a proper name to the sense of a sentence, and on the other hand, it must contain a mode of denotative introduction of the concept, which is the reference of the predicate.
To justify his claim, Dummatt says: one can refer to the sense of a predicate, for example, A, with such a phrase: "The sense of predicate 'A'" (The sense of perdicate "A") and in Frege's theory, this phrase, because it begins with a definite article, is considered a proper name and denotes an object.
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