خلاصة:
This article attempts to explain democratization in Iran through an eliteoriented
approach. According to this approach, the success and failure of
democratization depends on the political elite strategy. My argument is that
the fate of democratization is determined by elite strategies. If their strategy
is considered suppressive, an authoritarian cycle will take place in the
transition stage, but if the political elite strategy is considered nonsuppressive,
the index of democratic transition increases. In this study, the
political elites are divided into two groups: conservatives and reformists.
The analysis method is historical-narrative technique. The empirical
findings indicate that whenever the hardliners inside the government are
stronger than the opposition groups, they constrain the democratization by
suppressing the opposition (moderates and reformists), which leads to a
decrease in the index of democratic transition, as exemplified in the 13th
parliamentary in 1941. Whenever the reformers are stronger than the
conservatives and they are allowed to participate in elections, the index of
democratic transition tends to increase, as shown in the 17th parliament
under the rule of Muaddiq and the 7th presidential elections after the 1979
Revolution. The data demonstrates that democratization is still fragile in
Iran and it’s the fate would be determined by the relative power of
reformists and conservatives.
As a result, I argue that Iran’s democratic transition is fragile and it’s the
fate is determined by the relative power of reformists and conservatives.
ملخص الجهاز:
"Strategies of political leaders can be classified as follows: 1) Negotiation, 2) Democratic compromise, 3) Concession, 4) Elections, 5) Harshness (Suppression), and 6) Pact- making (Huntington, 1995; Pother, 2001; Gill, 2000).
The logical structure of this theoretical model has been formulated as follows: [(Political Elite Strategy ⊃ democratization )] My argument is that the fate of democratization in Iran would be determined by the relative power of reformists and conservatives.
So, the democratic C5= Creation of a Senate Assembly; C6= the right to dissolve the parliament by King; C7= Increasing military salaries; C8= Enforcing stringent press law against anyone criticizing the loyal family; C9= Emerging absolute th actors, liberals and mediates, could attend in the election (see Mudīr Sanechī, 1996; monarchy; E= Holding the 16 election.
In the third constitutional period, the following events occurred, which affected the activities of political actors in the process of democratization (see Turbatī Sanjābī, 1997; Abrahamian, 1982; Shajiee, 1993).
In such a situation, 18th parliamentary election took place, in which Muhammad Rezā-Shāh had suppressed his organized opposition and dissolved the following parties: 1) Independence Party; 2) Brothers party; 3) Aria party; 4) First National Front; 5) Iran party; 6) Union Party (Coalition of people party, Unity of Iran and Farzandān of Iran); 7) Toiler party(Hezb Zahmat-keshān); 8) The society of Muslim Warriors (Jāme'e-ye Mujāhedīn 'Eslam); 9) Nation Iran Party; 9) people’s party of Iran; 10) The Society of Rahā'ī-ye Kār va 'Andīshe.
In this social context, the 22nd parliamentary election was held in which the main parties and organized opposition had been suppressed by Muhammad Rezā-shāh state."