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Many scholars and philosophers have followed various paths to prove the existence of God; among them is the path of the soul, where the proof that relies on this path is called the 'argument of the soul'. In Islamic philosophy, Suhrawardi—who made psychology a starting point for constructing his philosophical system—is considered the first to attempt to prove the existence of God through this path, followed by philosophers such as Mulla Sadra, Sabzawari, and Allamah Tabataba'i, who completed his journey. As for Western philosophy, Descartes made the existence of the thinker and his thoughts the first of his philosophical principles, and sought to prove the existence of God through the existence of the soul and the existence of the concept of God within it, where Descartes' argument is called the 'trademark argument' in English. However, since the French philosopher worked on proving the existence of God through the soul and its attributes, we can also call this argument the argument of the soul and compare it to its counterpart presented in Islamic philosophy. The aforementioned argument of Descartes is considered an incomplete argument because it is based on an assertion of the principle of causality in which a confusion occurred between the existential and cognitive aspects of mental concepts, unlike the argument of the soul presented in Islamic philosophy, which can be viewed as a complete argument. Identifying basic principles and analyzing the essential elements that constitute any scientific system, and understanding the existing connection between these elements, is the best way to identify the nature of this system and, consequently, study the possibility of its realization. In this research, we have sought to analyze two essential elements of the intuitive philosophical system (namely: the philosophical system and intuition/witnessing), as well as to study how these two elements are connected to each other in this system, using this as a starting point to identify the identity of intuitive philosophy and, consequently, reach the possibility of its realization. To achieve this goal, we first worked on analyzing the elements that constitute the philosophical system (i.e., subject, method, and purpose) and searching for the reality of intuition (shuhud) and its benefit for knowledge, as it became clear that what is meant by philosophical identity in this system is philosophy in the special sense (i.e., rational, certain, existential knowledge), and regarding intuition, it is heart-based intuition in the technical sense of Sufism. After that, we sought to discuss the nature of the relationship between philosophical reason and mystical intuition in intuitive philosophy, as well as to explain the cause of the connection between these two cognitive means in the existential cognitive system, in addition to explaining the reality of the intuitive philosophical system and the possibility of its realization, as it became clear that the realization of this system does not entail any contradiction or impossibility; rather, moreover, we can benefit from the ability of both reason and intuition to create a cognitive system, and each of them can compensate for the weaknesses suffered by the other, in order to establish a consistent and effective existential scientific system and achieve the ultimate goal of such a system. Real perceptions are mental revelations and reflections of reality and the matter itself, whereas conventional perceptions are hypotheses considered by the mind to secure natural needs, and thus they have a conventional, stipulated, and hypothetical character. We have two basic opinions regarding the logical implication relationship between real and conventional perceptions: the first opinion is based on denying this logical relationship, where Al-Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani was the first to propose this view, followed by Allamah Tabataba'i, Sayyid Khomeini, and Shahid Motahhari; as for the second opinion, there is a logical implication relationship between both real perceptions and conventional perceptions that possess a real and existential basis. Based on this cognitive principle, proponents of the first opinion believe that it is impermissible to use real perceptions in theological issues, considering such use as revealing a confusion between truth and convention. As for the correct opinion, which expresses the famous view among theologians and most philosophers, it is permissible to use real perceptions in theological issues; therefore, this use is clearly witnessed in the science of Kalam at the level of both definitions and arguments, as it has been dealt with by theologians as an established cognitive principle. According to this view, theological issues are either part of real and existential perceptions, or they are conventional but have existential roots, and thus they are not part of pure conventions nor covered by the characteristics of purely conventional perceptions. The narration of Abu Laybid speaks about the secret and meaning of the disjointed letters in the Quran, pointing out during this to the emergence of a group of revolutionaries when these disjointed letters appearing at the beginning of the Surahs are realized, as this narration considers that the appearance of Maulana al-Hujjah (aj) is represented in the realization of 'Al-R' or 'Al-Mur'. Allamah Majlisi proposed many possibilities regarding the meaning of the narration in Bihar al-Anwar, and also became involved in the book of al-Raj'a with the issue of probable timing, where he specified the year 1155 AH as the year of probable appearance. On the other hand, this narration is liable to be a subject of bad exploitation, as happened with the Baha'i sect—represented by Abu al-Fadl al-Kalbaykani—which held onto it as evidence for the truthfulness of the claim of Ali Muhammad al-Shirazi (known as the Bab) which he proposed in 1260 AH. The author of these lines seeks to expand the discussion around this narration in terms of chain of transmission and indication by using the descriptive-analytical method. The results reached by this research indicate the weakness of the narration from both the chain of transmission and the indicative aspects, such that it cannot be relied upon in a serious matter like Imamate (or claimed prophethood), and even if it were relied upon in that, it applies completely to Imam al-Mahdi (aj). The only meaning of truth that is valid in the science of philosophy is: entitlement, as this concept includes all instances of truth and simultaneously prevents the non-truth from being included under its title (comprehensive of individuals and exclusive of others). The concept of entitlement is clarified through the correspondence between the holders of rights of various types (whether they are chosen or not) and their real (non-illusory) objectives or the goals of their natural movements, in proportion to the actions that lead them to those objectives or goals; in some cases, reason is capable of recognizing the rights of beings, but in most cases, it is forced to rely on revelation to recognize the rights of beings and the ways that lead to these rights. It is famous that the mainstay and fundamental pillar upon which Islamic philosophy relies is demonstration (i.e., establishing syllogistic reasoning), such that intuition in this science does not enjoy any value or status, except as a premise and support. In this article, we sought to state that intuition occupies great importance at the beginning of philosophy and in proving its axiomatic principle, as well as in some philosophical issues; such as: proving the immateriality of knowledge, proving the immateriality of the soul in the argument of the man suspended in the air, proving knowledge and its types (acquired knowledge and present knowledge), proving some premises of the primacy of existence, and explaining how sensory perceptions occur; indeed, intuition plays an essential and fundamental role in all demonstrative arguments; in other words, there is no philosophical issue except that it is witnessed by the soul directly or ultimately refers back to intuition; accordingly, intuition—whether through a medium or without one—is the source of the authority and validity of all philosophical claims and proofs, such that if intuition is negated, the value and status of demonstration will collapse as well.