چکیده:
Having reached an interim accord in Geneva, two governments with a tortured political history must now work to sell it and the diplomatic strategy they have laid out to their own constituencies back home. In this paper, the role of the United States Congress in the process of developing American foreign policy in general and, in the current matter of Iran’s nuclear file in particular will be examined. To do so, it describes the history of the relationship between the White House and Congress and then examines the difficult task of the Obama administration to garner support for its strategy in Congress. It reviews the reservations voiced by many in Congress regarding the Geneva nuclear interim accord as well as their misgivings regarding a final agreement. As the matter at hand involves high stake politics in the Middle East, it may carry grave consequences for the status quo in the region. The possible ramifications and the way this effects the position of those in Congress will also be explored. Lastly, since lobby groups have historically had a major role in American foreign policy towards the Middle East, their extensively-discussed role in this case as well as challenges they face will also be touched upon. In general, this paper proposes to describe specifically the way the US policy towards Iran is being formulated and what role Congress plays in the process. Effort will be made to find out to what extent the domestic politics has an impact on the approach of Congress towards Iran and how Congress may be influenced by Middle East regional powers.
خلاصه ماشینی:
In this paper, the role of the United States Congress in the process of developing American foreign policy in general and, in the current matter of Iran’s nuclear file in particular will be examined.
Fresh from diplomatic triumph in Geneva, Secretary of State John Kerry delivered a video message to Congress, urging them not to pass new sanctions against Iran while the executive branch and partners from around the world are easing and withdrawing some sanctions in the context of the interim deal.
State department spokesperson Jen Psaki called any new sanctions "unhelpful," and warned that it would compromise the unity of the six powers that are engaging Iran, a key tactical objective of Secretary Kerry in the Geneva talks and presumably in the six months to come (Klapper, 2013).
The success of the sanctions in applying pressure to the Iranian economy has been in part credited to the willingness of the United States to publically seek diplomacy and non-confrontational resolution with Iran throughout the Obama administration (Pecquet and Herb, 2013).
Once the administration began rallying support for the prospect of an interim deal and against a rush to new sanctions in mid-November after an unsuccessful first try in Geneva, they became locked in an information war with pro-Israel groups.
With its many opponents in Congress, the Obama Administration will have to work diligently to find ways to persuade and pressure its members to support the President’s approach and not pass comprehensive new sanctions that would at least complicate if not derail the long term negotiations and leave a country deeply suspicious of Iran nuclear ambitions with few options.