چکیده:
در این مقاله به ارزیابی نقش ایران در محاسبات سیاست خارجی هند در مقابل محور چین –پاکستان پرداخته شده است. تحولات ژئوپلیتیکی و ژئواستراتژیک پس از جنگ سرد فرصتهای جدیدی را در فضای اوراسیا به وجود آورده است. با توجه به شرایط جغرافیایی و ظهور دوباره رقابتهای ژئوپلیتیکی، ارتباط منطقهای از طریق بنادر از اهمیت ویژهای برخوردار گردیده است؛ بنابراین، ژئوپلیتیک بنادر به بحث روز در ارتباطات منطقهای تبدیل شده است. هند دارای منافع ژئوپلیتیکی، ژئواستراتژیکی و ژئواقتصادی بسیاری در منطقه اوراسیا است. با اینحال، این پتانسیل به دلیل عدم اتصال جغرافیایی هنوز شکوفا نشده است. در چشمانداز محور نوظهور چین-پاکستان، حرکت و اقدامات متقابل آنها محدود شدن منافع چندجانبه هند ازجمله اتصال به منطقه اوراسیا دیده میشود. در این پیچیدگیها، بندر چابهار ایران به دلیل موقعیت استراتژیک خود تبدیل به یک ابزار مهم برای هند شده است. با اینحال، ایران در همان پروژه نیز فرصتهای سرمایهگذاری را به چین و پاکستان ارائه داده است. دشمنیهای موجود و رقابت بین هند با چین و پاکستان، تبدیل پروژه پیشنهادی بندر چابهار به واقعیت را برای دهلینو دشوار کرده است. هدف پژوهش پیشرو بررسی وزن ژئوپلیتیکی چابهار و جایگاه آن در موازنههای ژئوپلیتیکی هند است. بنابراین، سوال اصلی پژوهش این است که موازنه ژئوپلیتیکی هند از طریق بندر چابهار با چه اهدافی است؟ نتایج نشان میدهد که اقدام هند برای توسعه بندر چابهار برای اتصال به اوراسیا در واقع یک پاسخ این کشور برای برطرف نمودن نگرانیهایی است که از جانب چین و پاکستان احساس میکند. نوشتار حاضر با استفاده از روش توصیفی-تبیینی و بهرهگیری از منابع کتابخانهای نگارش یافته است.
Extended Abstract IntroductionThe article offers an assessment of Iran’s role in India’s foreign policy calculations vis-a-vis Sino-Pak axis. The changing geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics in the post-Cold War era have brought about new possibilities and opportunities in the Eurasian space. Given the geographical conditions and re-emergence of geopolitical competition, regional connectivity through ports has taken a pivotal position in bilateral and multilateral engagements. Therefore, the port geopolitics has become a buzzword in the regional connectivity. India has many geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic interests in the Eurasian region. However, the potential has not been realized yet due to the lack of geographical connectivity. In the backdrop of emerging Sino-Pak axis, their moves and countermoves have been limiting India’s multilateral interests including the connectivity across the Eurasian region. In these matrices, Iran’s Chabahar Port due to its strategic location has become a crucial enabler for India. However, Iran has offered investment opportunities even to China and Pakistan in the same project. The existing enmities/competition between India and China-Pakistan has made it difficult for New Delhi to convert the proposed project of Chabahar Port into reality. The aim of this study is to investigate the geopolitical weight of Chabahar and its position in the geopolitical balance of India. Against this background, the article would try to give answers to this question: What are the goals of India's geopolitical balance through the port of Chabahar? The results show that India's move to develop the port of Chabahar to connect to Eurasia is actually a response to the actions of China and Pakistan.IntroductionSince the time immemorial, sea trade has been playing a significant role in the world economy. In this context, the role of ports remained critical which have been providing for connectivity between land and maritime trades. Currently, the Chabahar Port is figuring prominently in Indian foreign policy which has heightened the regional geopolitics over ports. It appears understandable in the context of two contradictory developments Gwadar and Chabahar ports in the South Asian region. Iran’s importance for India’s energy security is inevitable because of its large share of oil and gas in New Delhi’s imports and being a geopolitical pivotal of India-Eurasia connectivity.MethodologyHere, the method of data collection is based on library and documentary findings. In this way, information is gathered by referring to real and virtual resources. Then, the collected data are analyzed by qualitative- inferential method. The Results The results show that India's move to develop the port of Chabahar to connect to Eurasia is actually a response India's concerns over the actions of China and Pakistan. if Beijing links Chabahar to the New Silk Road and invests in it, India's only option is a pragmatic policy of finding a solution between its conflicting national and geopolitical interests, allying with the United States, negotiating with Tehran and maintaining a level presence in Chabahar. ConclusionIn the analysis, this study has concluded that India and Iran have mutual convergences in getting connected with the Eurasian region. The region has the potential of vast opportunities such as significant market, energy, security, and so on. However, India perceives that the emerging Sino-Pak axis is a challenge to its connectivity with the region. China and Pakistan have discovered new avenues such as the Gwadar Port and CPEC to convert their relations into a strategic alliance vis-a-vis India. Both have several reasons for their animosity with India such as boundary issues, Islamic fundamentalism, regional power politics, India’s rising power status, global leadership aspirations, growing Indo-US relations, Afghan and Baluchistan problems, and so on. Against this background, only Iran remains an option for India getting connected with the Eurasian region. They are having mutual convergence regarding geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic interests in the Eurasian region. Both countries have agreed with Russia to join the INSTC corridor along with other Eurasian stakeholders. The Chabahar Port is focal point of this corridor. Given the China’s CPEC and Gwadar strategy and its relations with Iran and Pakistan, it is concluded that India’s prompt response and strong commitment to start and completion of the Chabahar Port is paramount concern for the connectivity. Iran’s active response to India over the project indicates that it has some geopolitical and geostrategic congruence with the latter.