چکیده:
یکی از استدلالها به نفع دوگانهانگاری و علیه مادیانگاری استدلال تصورپذیری است. طبق استدلال تصورپذیری کریپکی، اگر جهان زامبی تصوپذیر باشد، وجود زامبیها بهلحاظ متافیزیکی ممکن است. ازاینرو، آگاهی غیرفیزیکی است. به اصل تصورپذیری کریپکی اعتراض شده است که با پدیده ضرورت پسینی کریپکیایی سازگار نیست. از اینرو، استدلال تصورپذیری صرفا حاکی از آن است که جهان زامبی منطقا ممکن است، اما امکان منطقی مستلزم امکان متافیزیکی نیست. چالمرز برای پاسخگویی به این اعتراض از ایدۀ معناشناسی دوبعدیگرا بهره میگیرد. ضرورت پسینی کریپکیایی آن چیزی را که بروفق مفهوم اولیه تصورپذیر است، بهلحاظ متافیزیکی غیرممکن نمیسازد. چالمرز میکوشد صورتبندی جدیدی از استدلال کریپکی علیه ماتریالیسم براساس ایدۀ دوبعدیگرایی بهدست دهد. در نهایت، استدلال تصورپذیری کریپکی را با استدلال تصورپذیری چالمرز مقایسه میکنم.
Introduction: Arguments in favor of dualism (and against
materialism) typically seek to move from the epistemological
distinction of physical facts and the facts of consciousness (conscious
mental states) to the metaphysical distinction of physical processes
and consciousness. These arguments often accept that epistemological
premise requires ontological results. The idea of conceivability is one
of these types of arguments. According to this argument, it is
conceivable that there is an organ called a zombie that is the same as
the conscious being in all physical matters, but is completely devoid
of conscious mental states. In this article, I intend to compare Kripke's
(1980) conceivability argument with Chalmers' (1997; 2010)'s
conceivability argument.
According to Kripke's argument, if "pain" and " the firing of cfibers"
are the same, then this identity must be necessary. But this
identity is possible, so one can imagine a possible world in which pain
occurs without any brain state at all (the world of pain apart from the
body), and one can imagine a possible world in which " the firing of cfibers"
occurs without any pain (zombie world). As a result, in those
possible worlds, " the firing of c-fibers" is not. One of the objections
to Kripke's argument is that the principle of conceivability is
incompatible with the phenomenon of Kripke's posterior necessity.
According to the objection through a posteriori necessity, there is a
difference between the conceivable (logical possibility) and the
(metaphysical) possibility. The conceivability argument merely shows
that the zombie world is logically possible, but the logical possibility
of the zombie world is quite different from its metaphysical
possibility; For conceptual possibility, mere conceptual coherence (or
impossibility) suffices, but we need something more to show that the
zombie world has a metaphysical possibility.
Chalmers seeks to respond to this objection with the idea of twodimensional
semantics. Chalmers, of course, tries to formulate the
same Kripke's conceivability argument against materialism based on
the idea of two-dimensional semantics. He argues that we can go from
epistemological premise (logical possibility) to ontological
conclusions (metaphysical possibility). To do this, we need an
intermediary. We must first infer justified epistemologies (ideas of
conceivable things) from epistemological premise (ideas of necessary
and possible things), and then arrive at ontological conclusions from
justified premise. He clings to the idea of two-dimensional semantics
for the connection between epistemological and modal premise..
Methods of Study: In this article, first-hand and original sources
have been used and an attempt has been made to obtain the desired
results by using the method of conceptual analysis and the
conventional method of philosophical reasoning.
Findings: In this article I have shown that 1) Chalmers formulates
Kripke's argument based on the idea of two-dimensionalism. 2)
Kripke's argument was based entirely on the identity of conscious
states and physical states, while Chalmers relied on the concept of
supervenience of facts about consciousness on physical facts. 3)
Chalmers, unlike Kripke, does not rely on essentialism about
phenomena. 4) Chalmers argues that Kripke's arguments against token
identity are not conclusive, but that arguments against type identity
work. 5) Chalmers, unlike Kripke, tries to justify the transition from
the primary conceivability to the primary possibility. But Kripke takes
this transfer for granted.
Conclusion: Both Kripke (1980) and Chalmers (1997; 2010)'s
argument are based on the assumption that conceivability requires
possibility. In other words, both resort to the logical possibility of
separating physical states from phenomenal states.
Keywords: Kripke, Chalmers, The Idea of Two-Dimensional
Semantics, conceivability Argument, Dualism, and Materialism.