چکیده:
One of the important questions in the epistemology of non-physical realities is phenomenal awareness. The main claim of physicalism, including the mind representation theory, is that the true explanation of events is only possible through physical explanations, therefore, an explanation based on physical and objective laws can be presented for such realities. In contrast to this view, analytical phenomenologists believe that conscious experiences and the subjective aspect of phenomenal awareness do not conform to physical, objective, and cognitive-scientific explanations. This article attempts to, after formulating the problem of phenomenal awareness based on subjectivity based on the perception of the perceiver, present the solutions of mind representation theories and express the criticisms raised against them, and address the question of whether representation theories can provide an acceptable theoretical framework for causally explaining the problem of phenomenal awareness?
خلاصه ماشینی:
Awareness of Appearance from the Perspective of Mental Representation Theories Seyed Mohammad Hosseini *- Master of Science in Philosophy of Science, Islamic Azad University, Tehran Science and Research Branch Kambiz Badie - Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, University of Tehran (Article Received: 2013/01/05; Article Accepted: 2013/02/19) Abstract One of the important questions in the epistemology of non-physical realities is phenomenal awareness.
This article seeks to, after formulating the problem of phenomenal awareness based on subjectivity based on the perception of the perceiver, present the solutions of mental representation theories and express the criticisms leveled against them, and address the question of whether representational theories can provide an acceptable theoretical framework for explaining the issue of phenomenal awareness?
In this confrontation, representationalists such as Dretske and Tye believe that the phenomenal characteristic of conscious experience is reducible to representational states and intentional content, while phenomenologists such as Nedblock, Chalmers, and Shoemaker do not believe in such reduction (Pitt, 2004).
In this article, we first present a formulation of the problem of phenomenal awareness based on the problem of subjectivity dependent mentality and show that the epistemology of constructive naturalism of this theory raises the issue of its explanatory adequacy.
Presenting the Problem of Phenomenal Awareness and Subjectivity Dependent Mentality Michael Tye, in his influential book Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of Mind, considers the central core of reflections on the problem of phenomenal awareness to be the same problem of subjectivity dependent mentality and the perspective of the perceiver 2, which expresses the intrinsic characteristic and describes the nature of conscious experience.
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