چکیده:
Based on the famous metaphysical classification, beings are divided into two categories: universals and particulars. Particular beings are distinct objects that are unique and non-repeatable. Each of us humans is considered a particular being. However, there are similarities among particular beings based on which we categorize them. Every particular object has common properties and repeatable relations with other objects. These common properties and relations have given rise to a problem known as the problem of universals. The main question regarding universals is whether they possess a real identity, or if they are nothing more than constructs of our mind and language. Realism, Nominalism, and Conceptualism are three famous theories regarding universals. David M. Armstrong, a contemporary naturalistic philosopher, after criticizing various theories about universals based on his metaphysical naturalism, has proposed a theory that he calls scientific realism. By introducing the state of affairs in his ontology, he considers universality and particularity as two aspects of a single state of affairs. This article examines and critiques Armstrong's theory of universals.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Remarks on David Armstrong's Naturalistic Theory of Universals 1 Mohammad Sadegh Zahedi Aref Aiini 2 Abstract Based on the famous metaphysical classification, beings are divided into two categories: universals and particulars.
1552) While referring to concepts such as participation and replication, which are used in Plato's theory to express the relation between Forms and particular things, Armstrong states that these concepts do not have a clear meaning do not have, and they not only do not solve the problem, but they also create other issues and problems.
(Balaguer, Mark, 2014) According to Armstrong, immanent realism can be formulated in two ways based on how the universal exists in things and how the relationship between the universal and the particular is in a single thing.
102 According to Armstrong, although Locke is placed in the nominalist group, his view regarding substance as something that constitutes the particularity of a thing and to which the identity of the thing depends, and that qualities are identities separate from substance that are joined to the substance or the substance supports them, expresses a type of relational immanent realism.
87) 3-4- Non-relational Immanent Realism According to this view, properties and relations between things are universals, in the sense that they exist fully in multiple things at the same time.
113) According to Armstrong, what we observe in reality and what is scientifically investigable is the state of affairs, which is something other than a pure particular that lacks any property or relation, and a pure universal that is not present in any particular thing.
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