چکیده:
Religious discourses and texts, especially narrations, are not uniform. They are different and diverse. Since ancient times, jurists, when counting types of discourse, have referred to jurisprudential, judicial, governmental, declarative, and innate/natural discourses. Jurisprudential discourses are essentially issued in the position of legislation and law-making and are usually generalizable. Judicial discourses are specific decisions of the Infallible (peace be upon him) to resolve a specific case or issue. Governmental discourses arise from the governmental position of the Infallible (peace be upon him) and are for managing a situation or issue. Declarative discourse contains an ethical, educational, social, or similar point and is essentially not in the position of legislating as a human being and individual. Innate discourses solely refer to the expression of the Infallible's nature. Although the difference between these types of discourse has been noted by jurists in the context of deriving secondary jurisprudential rulings, it has not been examined from the perspective of the role they can play in resolving conflicts between texts. This article, by reviewing the typology of religious discourses and enumerating examples of them, emphasizes the importance of distinguishing these discourses from one another in resolving conflicts between texts. Resolving conflict by relying on the typology of discourse in many cases also helps in identifying fixed and variable rulings and spares the jurist from redundant and non-customary collections among narrations that have no value or validity.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Although the differences between these types of discourses have been considered by jurists in the context of deriving secondary jurisprudential rulings, they have not been examined from the perspective of the role they can play in resolving conflicts between texts.
158) Other contemporary jurists have also resolved the conflict between reports related to the permissibility of Anfal and the narrations of the chapter on reviving wasteland lands by considering governmental rulings.
137) In the narration of Muhammad ibn Muslim, it is also mentioned that I was in the presence of Imam Sadiq (peace be upon him) when a rope seller came to his presence and said: May my life be sacrificed for you, among our assets, including transactions and their profits, we know that your right is also present, and we have been negligent in paying it.
419) Ibn Qudamah, in his two books Sharh al-Kabir and al-Mughni, has relied on the general hadith of the Prophet (peace be upon him and his family) and does not consider the permission of the Imam as a condition for the realization of ownership.
58) Indications such as the fact that legislating the rule of ownership solely through revival and without the need for permission and governmental frameworks paves the way for the depletion of resources and unfair exploitation by the wealthy, reinforce the possibility that the famous narration of the Prophet (peace be upon him and his family) is a governmental command and not an expression of a permanent Sharia rule.
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