Epistemic Duty; An Overview of William P. Alston's Perspective معرفی و نقد

خلاصه ماشینی:

At the same time, by accepting the possibility of indirect voluntary influence on beliefs, he considers the existence of intellectual duties and obligations to be conceivable from this aspect, although he denies the epistemic dimension of these duties. Of course, some have claimed that logically, it is not possible for us to form a belief as soon as we will it,02 but Alston does not see sufficient reason for this claim and therefore, only considers it psychologically impossible, in the sense that we do not find this ability in ourselves, and we are not constructed in such a way that we can create propositional states within ourselves as soon as we will and decide, without performing any other action. In Alston's view, no; because as we said, long-term control has degrees, and regarding beliefs, although the principle of this type of control over them is acceptable, a sufficient amount of this type of control that can serve as a basis for the application of deontic categories does not exist; because it is not the case that this type of control always and in all cases proves effective; rather, humans sometimes succeed in employing this type of control and many times they do not succeed. C) Alston accepted a certain amount of long-term volitional control over beliefs whose truth or falsehood is not completely obvious, but on one hand, he considered this amount of control to be too negligible to serve as a justification for duties and obligations from this direction, and on the other hand, he considered the exercise of such control to be epistemically undesirable; because attempting to find belief in a proposition, without having sufficient evidence for its truth at hand, is not epistemically desirable.