چکیده:
For a long time, jurists have discussed and examined the conditions and powers of the Islamic ruler. A group of jurists considers the government and administration of society during the Occultation to be the right of the jurists. The emphasis on ijtihad as an essential condition for the legitimacy of the political system in the era of Occultation, and consequently the political guardianship of mujtahids, has led to two practical results: A. Insistence on the impermissibility of delegating government to others and maintaining the direct and immediate political guardianship of the faqih in state affairs as the only instance (the just ruler) in the era of Occultation; B. Permissibility of granting permission to a non-faqih and the emergence of an authorized and legitimate ruler. In contrast, another group of jurists has turned to distinguishing between religious (sharia) and customary (urf) matters, considering religious matters such as judgment, the execution of prescribed punishments (hudud), and Hasbiya matters to be the duties of jurists, while customary matters such as politics and security are considered the duties of the just ruler. Among this group, the venerable jurist Ayatollah Abdolkarim Haeri has accepted a dual view of guardianship: 'the guardianship of the glorious Sultan in customary matters and the guardianship of the fully-qualified Faqih in religious matters.' This article intends to explain and critique the views of the late Haeri.
خلاصه ماشینی:
The difference between the two meanings of guardianship is that in the second meaning, one of the communal obligations (wajib kifa'i) must be present so that the personal permission of others in undertaking it is valid, whereas the first meaning is not contingent upon its existence; rather, he has authority over properties and lives and performs any disposal he wishes in them, just like the disposal of owners in their own property.
19) Ayatollah Haeri believes that the second type of guardianship is a communal obligation (wajib kifa'i) upon all people; whereas the second type of guardianship is not exclusive to it, and includes cases that are upon an individual specific individual is obligatory, and its performance must be with the opinion of the jurist; it also includes matters such as retaliation (qisas).
Ayatollah Haeri's view arises from considering the second type of guardianship to be exclusive to communal obligations that are conditional upon the permission of the jurist, but as previously stated, it is not limited to these cases and also includes cases that are the duty of a specific person, but their performance is contingent upon the permission of another; therefore, Ayatollah Haeri's interpretation of the two types of guardianship is debatable; however, the interpretation of Sheikh Ansari seems more correct, which was mentioned.
The point of divergence for the second meaning is like retaliation (qisas), according to one opinion, the sale of hoarded goods when people are in need of them, and the disposal of the property of a profligate or an interdicted person; in these cases, the ruler does not have the right to act independently, and the disposal by the right-holder must also be with the permission of the jurist.
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