چکیده:
The soul's presence knowledge of itself according to Suhrawardi forms the basis of his epistemology and the foundation of the epistemology of most thinkers after him. Suhrawardi proves, through various reasons, the soul's presence knowledge of its essence, the soul's presence knowledge of the essence's actions and affections, and the soul's presence knowledge of the essence's faculties. He attempts to introduce the soul as an identifying agent that, for the perception of the essence and its faculties, not only does not need a medium but cannot need one. In Suhrawardi's view, acquisitive knowledge (ilm husuli) can only be justified as an accidental attribute to the soul if the soul's presence knowledge of its own essence is accepted beforehand; because as long as an essence does not find itself, it cannot find its attributes and accidents. On this basis, he allows for a significant scope for presence knowledge. This article presents Suhrawardi's arguments regarding the soul's presence knowledge, examines their value and efficiency, and responds to the criticisms leveled against them. Ultimately, this article shows that although these arguments rely on logical principles, they are not equal in terms of value or the scope of perceptions and proofs. To accept these arguments, both attention to Suhrawardi's specific foundations as a prerequisite is necessary, and the capacity and ability of the soul regarding different perceptions must be taken into account.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Article Type: Research Epistemological Considerations of the Arguments for the Presential Knowledge of the Soul from Suhrawardi's Perspective Somayyeh Ahmadi / PhD student in Philosophy and Islamic Theology, Islamic Azad University, Central Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran Somayyeh_Ahmadi@yahoo.
To examine these items, it is necessary to consider Suhrawardi's foundations regarding the soul, the luminous system of the universe, and the rational division of knowledge into acquisitive and presential as the premises of these arguments.
Of course, the Sheikh of Illumination, in another formulation of this argument, uses reductio ad absurdum, the revolution in knowledge, and ultimately the transformation of presence into absence, and finally concludes the presential nature of the knowledge of essence by essence (Suhrawardi, 1977, Vol. 1, pp.
Suhrawardi, by explaining dominant illumination, draws attention to the soul's encompassment of the external world, in which, according to this foundation, attention and attention is one of its main components; whereas Mulla Sadra, by stating that presential knowledge is the very existence of the object at the soul, introduces detailed attention as an additional matter and concludes that it is possible for a knowledge to exist for the soul, yet fall into neglect.
After stating these points, it can be said that we can only accept Sheikh al-Ishraq's argument for the soul's presential knowledge of sensibles and material objects when this perception is considered in light of Sheikh al-Ishraq's principles.
He even considers imaginary forms to be external beings that reside in the world of archetypes (Mithal), and the soul perceives them through presential knowledge (Suhrawardi, 1977, Vol. 2, pp.
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