چکیده:
Istishab is one of the most widely used evidences in the derivation of Sharia rulings, one of its four types based on the certain and uncertain time is Istishab al-Istiqlali. Istishab al-Istiqlali means that if the time of certainty, doubt, and the 'certainty' (mutaqan) are all present for the obligated person, but the 'doubtful' (mashkuk) time is assumed to be in the future, then its continuation is maintained until the future. This Istishab, much like the common 'Istishab al-Hali', has important applications in jurisprudence and the derivation of its rulings. There are also evidences to prove its validity. However, it has been mostly neglected by jurists (Usuliyyun), and serious discussion regarding this type of Istishab has not taken place in the books of Usul. Utilizing the absolute nature of the narrations of Istishab and applying the pillars of Istishab proves the validity of Istishab al-Istiqlali and responds to the objections raised. Furthermore, a review of its applications in jurisprudence, such as the permissibility of 'Bara' al-Zimmah' (exemption from liability), the non-reversal of blood money (Diyah), the validity of Salaf transactions, the justice of an ameen (trustee), the change of fatwa, etc., demonstrates its importance in proving jurisprudential issues.
خلاصه ماشینی:
In the stage of argumentation, we expand upon this famous statement and say: by removing the specificity, not only can the narration be extended to all cases of current (hali) and common Istishab, but it can also be applied to grant validity to cases of prospective (istiqbali) Istishab; therefore, it must be said that this narration is a good reason for proving the validity of this type of Istishab; because the Imam (as) considers the genus of certainty as a general rule and says: only certainty can negate certainty, not doubt, and it does not matter whether the object of doubt is a current or a prospective matter.
The method of reasoning with this narration is the same as the previous narration; rather, considering the Imam's expression "لیس ینبغی," it is clear that he is referring to a general rule established among rational people (Uqala), based on the principle that the genus of certainty should not be negated due to the genus of doubt; regardless of whether the object of doubt, or the doubted matter, is current (hali) or prospective (istiqbali).
But if we accept the other view and say that the apparent meaning of the Istishab narrations is that the intended meaning of certainty is certainty itself, and the intended meaning of doubt is doubt itself, as some, such as the late Na'ini, have held and have criticized the late Sheikh and Akhund for (Na'ini, 1352, 2/355; Khoei, 1417, 2/29; Imam Khomeini, 1381, 32), in this case, the objection is not valid and prospective Istishab also applies; because in this case, we have nothing to do with the certain and the doubtful we have nothing to do with, but rather the important thing is the current certainty and doubt, both of which exist.
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