چکیده:
The main problem of this paper is “Matter mistake” and “Formal mistake” and its result is "Matter mistake is meaningless; what is in principle described as correct and incorrect form". Studies showed Avicenna has no statement or proof about Matter Mistake and his definition of logic can be a start point for Classical logic. By accepting this statement, we need to accept a role for Matter Mistake in the fallacy argument. Nasir al-Din Tusi has used it and neglects all Matter Mistakes in fallacy, but on the other hand, Ghotb considered a place for it and so his argument is not consistent with this statement. Ghotb believes that Matter Mistake has no meaning by comparing it to the real world due to the casual and necessity of foundations of knowledge. This belief also exists in Nasir al-Din Tusi's thought but it is due to premises of syllogism and logical definitions. Now we think since these traditional logical discussions are so general and denotation criteria are not the same, so it has no contradiction to consider mistakes accompanying matter.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Qutb Razi, based on the self-evidence and necessity of the first principles of knowledge, and Khwaja Nasir, based on reflection on the premises of syllogism, propositions, and the commentator's words, have ruled that in application with the external world, material error has no acquired meaning; however, what comes in the material discussions of ancient logic are general discussions, and the criterion for application is the general criteria obtained through argument and the commentator's words.
However, the specific epistemological geometry of this research is as follows: after presenting the historical background of the problem and explaining the formal nature of logic, Ibn Sina's definition of thought and logic in the book Isharat is addressed, and then Khwaja Nasir's interpretation of Ibn Sina's provocative statement, and Qutb al-Din Razi's different and scholarly interpretation of the Sheikh's words are presented.
The exclusivity of attention to the second movement in the definition of thought, and consequently the acceptance of the occurrence of error only at this stage, is not observed in any of Ibn Sina's other logical texts written with a nine-part system; nor is it found in writings such as Tusi's Asas al-Iqtibas, Lukari's Bayan al-Haqq, and Qutb al-Din Shirazi's Durrat al-Taj, which are written according to the nine-part logical system.
1 A noteworthy point is that Dabiran Katibi's explanation in the definition of logic refers to the same explanation of Ibn Sina in al-Isharat; meaning, for thought, he only mentions its second movement and also attributes the occurring error to that same "form"; however, Qutb al-Din Razi, in his commentary on Dabiran's words, does not refer to either of these two matters.
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