چکیده:
The problem of determinism and free will is one of the fundamental issues in the history of human thought, and it has been a site of encounter for diverse and sometimes contradictory views of various deterministic, libertarian, and compatibilist schools. What you have before you is the result of an investigation and reflection on the most important anti-deterministic approaches of Western philosophers over the last half century, as well as the specific strategy of Mulla Sadra in the Islamic world to defend free will; these approaches attempt to re-examine and solve the issue by re-evaluating the meaning and implications of determinism and free will.
خلاصه ماشینی:
The Problem of Determinism and Free Will in Western and Islamic Moderate Approaches Fakhre-Sadat Alavi 1 Mohammad Ali Ejhei 2 Abstract The problem of determinism and free will is one of the fundamental issues in the history of human thought, and has been a site of encounter for diverse and sometimes contradictory views of various schools of determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism.
What follows is the result of an investigation and reflection on the most important anti-deterministic approaches of Western philosophers in the last half century, as well as Mulla Sadra's specific strategy in the Islamic world to defend free will; these approaches attempt to re-examine and resolve the issue by re-investigating and reflecting on the meaning and implications of determinism and free will.
The major problem here is that if all events in the world — including all human actions — are subject to causal laws and effects become necessary through antecedent conditions, then apparently free will and consequently our responsibility for what emanates from us will be negated.
To understand the other type of impossibility, note the famous example of Giden Rosen 1 (which is taken from the Bible) and Wallace's response to it: Rosen, in objecting to Wallace's criterion for determining free will (meaning reflective self-control: the moral power to think and act morally), points out that it is entirely conceivable that a person possessing reflective self-control might have no voluntary control over their actions.
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