چکیده:
In this article, we first explain the meaning of the identity theory between mind and body, and then refer to some of the arguments for this theory. In the first argument, we refer to Smart's theory. Based on William Okham's view that if a phenomenon can be explained materially, it should not be interpreted with metaphysical concepts, he claims that since all mental states today, such as love, hate, and knowledge, are physically explicable, abstract soul should not be used to justify these states. In criticizing this theory, we have shown that in addition to Okham's basis being rationally incorrect, despite scientific progress, human empirical knowledge still cannot provide an acceptable explanation for mental states. Furthermore, we refer to Davidson's argument regarding the identity theory and state the criticisms against it, and finally, we conclude that those who believe in this identity between soul and body do not have strong and correct arguments for this theory.
خلاصه ماشینی:
In the early formulations of this theory, the issue of type identity was raised, meaning that, for example, each of the mental concepts such as knowledge, love, and pain is identical in the external world at all times and places with the stimulation of c-fibers in the brain.
Given the two aforementioned objections based on reasoned intellectual grounds, even if we assume that empirical sciences provide a correct physical-chemical justification for mental qualities that is agreed upon by all scientists, it still does not mean the negation of a metaphysical cause, and at the very least, the possibility arises that the metaphysical soul plays an effective role, directly and immediately, in the creation of mental qualities such as knowledge.
A third objection raised here is that even assuming empirical sciences explain the process of creating mental qualities and justify and explain this issue with correct scientific evidence; the question is, for what reason should we consider mental qualities to be the same as brain processes and believe in this identity between the two?
Similarly, someone might claim that the same relationship exists between the neural activities of the brain and the emergence of mental qualities, and that mental qualities possess a reality other than the functioning of the brain's nerves; therefore, it is necessary to provide evidence for this identity and ontological unity of these two in the external world, and mere physical-chemical explanations in the brain are not sufficient to prove this identity (Humphrey & Nicholas, 1993, p.
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