چکیده:
The idea of U.S. emba11y seizure, 11 a 1pontaneou1 1tudent movement in response to U.S. policies a1aln1t Iran, wu formed in the bqlnnln1 or 1979, The Idea wu flnt brou1ht up in the Coordination Council or Solidarity Consolldatlon Office (Shony-e Hamahan1hlDat'tar-e Tahkeem-e Vahdat) by the repre1entatlvesor thl1 or11niz1tlon and Muslim Studentl or Sharif Unlvenlty or Technolo0, The1eizure, known a1 the "Occupation or the E1plona1e Den" and "the Second Revolution," took place on November ~th,1979. Thus the author or the present article analyze1 the predllpo1ln11round1 and cau1es of the U .s. emba11y take-over. Accordln1 to theauthor, the formation of the U.S. emba11y 1eizure In Tehran wa1 thecro11ln1 over or two different but lmportnt events: The meetln1 or Iranian Interim 1overnment Prime Mlnllter, Bazarsan, and Carter'• national security advisor, Benhln1ky, In Alaerla, u well a1 welcomln1 or the 1bah by the Unlted State1. The backwa1b or Buaraan· Benhln1ky meedna Inside Iran, owlna to the el.l1ttn1 vlew1 reaardlna U.S. policies a1alnst Iran, caused objectionable attltude111 to Iran• American relatlon1, Its Immediate con1equences be1D1 revealed after the seizure. Meanwhile, another Incident cau1ln1 public an1er In the Iranian society was welcomln1 orthe 1hah. As maintained by the author, the most Important consequence or the U.S. emba11y seizure wa1 the Interim Government resl&natlon and consequently handlna over orthe country's Internal affairs to the Revolutionary Council.
خلاصه ماشینی:
First, the meeting of Iranian interim government's Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, and Jimmy Carter's national security advisor, Berzhinsky, in Algeria; and second, welcoming of the Shah by the United States.
Naming the seizure as the "Occupation of the Spying Nest" and "the Second Revolu~~n·\ denotes the nature and the wide dimensions of this major historical event; its outcomes and consequences still prevailing after two decades, The interim government and the United States had regular contacts on several occasions under diplomatic relations framework.
"<8> In his statement on the visit, Bazargan only pointed out to the extent he was informed and the subject of negotiations with Berzhinsky; however, EbrahimYazdi laid stress on Ayatollah Khomeini's attitude towards the policy of brinkmanship and that Imam Khomeini and the Revolution Council were well-aware of the meeting.
S. , as well as in the American embassy in Tehran, there was a rather clear perception towards the issue of the Shah: manifestation of reaction (inside Iran) in respect of admitting him and its contradiction with U.
"(26> As a reason to agree with admitting the Shah, Carter later described the reason for admitting the Shah is: "Iranian officials promised to protect our citizens there!'(27> Later, Hashemi released a report of this meeting in Tehran's Friday Prayer in 1985 saying: "Just today I read a document that put me down and that's these people (liberals) have tight relations with the U.
S. embassy, it is mentioned: "The most important political issue, during the next 4-6 weeks, will be determining the (type of) Islamic republic of Iran's government.