Abstract:
Since the emergence of non-classical logics in the twentieth century, the assumption that logical knowledge is a priori has been challenged. Currently, logicians speak of preferring one logical theory over another and presenting a model of rational choice. “Inference to the best explanation” is a proposed model for the rational selection among scientific theories, and in this paper, we show that logical theories have the necessary features to apply such a methodology in the field of logic. Particularly, we show that such preferential treatment is not merely a liberal choice of a logical language, as Carnap supposed, but the inconsistency with some accepted evidence leads logicians to choose a logic theory that is compatible with that evidence. The Meaning variances of the logical constants are one of the issues that challenge the commensurability of logic theories. Having explained different solutions to this problem, we try to defend the best one in a way that avoids criticism.
Machine summary:
The Methodology of Inference to the Best Explanation: A Model for Selecting Logical Theories Masoud Alvand1, Mortaza Haj Hosseini 2, Amir Ehsan Karbasizadeh 3 (Article Received: 2019/11/08 - Article Accepted: 2020/09/13) Abstract The emergence of non-classical logics in contrast to classical logic has eliminated the presumption of a priori logical knowledge, such that logicians speak of preferring one logical theory over others and have presented a model for reasonable selection among them.
com Introduction The emergence of non-classical logics in contrast to classical logic has raised the issue of reasonable selection among logics, and recently logicians such as Priest and Williamson have spoken of making such a selection based on the methodology of inference to the best explanation 1 or abduction 2.
From Priest's point of view, the reasonable selection of a theory from among other theories, regardless of what that theory is intended to explain, is based on unified criteria: When faced with theories, in empirical sciences, metaphysics, ethics, logic, or any other field, we choose the theory that better meets the criteria defining a good theory than the rest.
In this case, for example, although classical and intuitionistic logicians use a single symbol for negation with regard to the difference in inference rules governing this connective in these two logics 1, they consider a different meaning for it: (Refer to the image on the page) Therefore, although two logicians think they disagree about the truth or falsehood of the sentence AA˅, they are actually talking about two different sentences cAA˅ and IAA˅ (or better to say A˅ccA and A˅IIA), and their disagreement is actually a verbal dispute 3.
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