Abstract:
Although Abu al-Barakat considers place and time as preconditions for motion and time not as a measure of motion but as a measure of existence, he believes that motion can be defined based on an intuitive concept of time, which is different from the theoretical concept of time, and thereby resolves the circularity that exists in Aristotle's definition of motion, which is the gradual (and therefore temporal) transition from potentiality to actuality. In discussing the existence or non-existence of motion, Ibn Sina divides motion into determinate and indeterminate, attributing objective existence to the latter and mental existence to the former, Abu al-Barakat believes that motion cannot be absolutely non-existent, even if it has a momentary and unstable existence. In discussing the cause of motion, Abu al-Barakat agrees with Ibn Sina's view that the mover is different from the moved. This article also examines the views of Ibn Sina and Abu al-Barakat regarding the unity of motion and the contradiction and opposition between motions.
Machine summary:
ir (Received: December 2012, Accepted: February 2013) Abstract Although Abu al-Barakat considers place and time as prerequisites for motion and time not as the quantity of motion but as the quantity of existence, he believes that motion can be defined based on an intuitive concept of time, which is different from the theoretical concept of time, and thereby resolves the circularity that exists in Aristotle's definition of motion, which is the gradual (and therefore temporal) emergence from potentiality to actuality.
In the discussion of the cause of motion, Abu al-Barakat agrees with Ibn Sina's view that the mover is different from the moved.
Keywords: Ibn Sina, Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi, Motion, Mover, Moved Introduction The existence of motion and the quality of its existence have been the focus of attention of philosophers and natural scientists since ancient times.
Although the concept of motion in Ibn Sina’s philosophy has been addressed independently or jointly, the views of Ibn Sina and Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi on the subject of motion have not been specifically considered, compared, or critically analyzed.
Therefore, it can be said that from Ibn Sina's point of view, *tawassutiyyah* motion is an objective reality in which potentiality approaches complete actuality, but *qati'iyyah* motion is a mental conception of motion in which all potentiality has been realized.
There is a circularity in the definition of motion, which both Ibn Sina and Abu al-Barakat, following Aristotle’s view, considered motion to be a gradual emergence from potentiality to actuality.
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