Abstract:
In this article, while referring to the concept of asymmetric warfare, the author examines Iraq's strategy for confronting coalition forces. To accurately examine Iraq's counter-strategy, the author has generally divided the Iraqi crisis into several periods and examined Iraq's counter-strategy in each period. Iraq's strategy in the pre-war period was to avoid entering the war by creating division in the international community and other approaches; during the implementation of military operations by coalition forces, it involved prolonging the war, drawing coalition forces into the quagmire of urban warfare, conducting naval operations, exporting the crisis to neighboring countries, using weapons of mass destruction, creating environmental disasters through the destruction of oil fields, and causing human catastrophes through war refugees, etc. At the end, the author concludes: what led to the rapid victory of the Allied forces in Iraq, in addition to the weakness and inefficiency of the Iraqi armed forces and the lack of popular support for the Iraqi regime, was the technological superiority of the Allied forces and the presence of professional military forces, which played an important role in this victory. Nevertheless, an important dimension of asymmetric warfare has not yet been fully realized in Iraq, and despite the official end of the war, conflicts continue in a non-classical manner by various Iraqi forces.
Machine summary:
Iraq's strategy in the pre-war period was to avoid entering the war by creating division in the international community and other approaches; during the implementation of the coalition forces' military operations, it was to prolong the war, drag coalition forces into the quagmire of urban warfare, conduct naval operations, export the crisis to neighboring countries, use weapons of mass destruction, create environmental disasters through the destruction of oil fields, and cause human disasters through war refugees, etc.
The social costs that were emphasized included the emergence of disagreement within the international community, a diplomatic crisis among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and deep disagreement among NATO and European Union members, domestic political opposition, a long and ambiguous war, and widespread instability in the Middle East and extra-regional areas; and potential achievements also included removing the Saddam regime as a factor of instability in the region and destroying Iraq's capacity for weapons of mass destruction.
The failure to discover weapons of mass destruction from the end of the war until now has led to speculations that the regime may have pretended to place chemical weapons at the disposal of battlefield commanders in an attempt to prevent the military operations of the coalition forces through fear and concern over the consequences of such actions.
In such a scenario, it is possible that the Iraqi regime decided not to provide evidence of its weapons of mass destruction in order to force the coalition countries into speculation about them and thereby prevent the war.
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