Abstract:
Rational virtues in the process of deriving rulings and in the position of reliability and issuing fatwas are important issues that jurists and mujtahids must undertake to acquire. Undoubtedly, the lack of these virtues leads to a reduction in the prestige and credibility of the fruits of jurisprudence. Our assumption is that religious scholars, like other thinkers, are overtly and covertly subject to moral afflictions and damages. Numerous virtues, including openness of mind, intellectual perseverance, precision and focus, intellectual humility, intellectual courage, intellectual caution, intellectual openness, intellectual fairness, and intellectual independence, are a set of virtues that affect the credibility of knowledge. Since the beliefs of the mujtahid play an essential role in ijtihad and the derivation of Sharia rulings, this article examines the role of the rational virtue of 'intellectual humility' in the process of deriving Sharia rulings. The result is that adorning oneself with the virtue of 'humility' removes the veil of egoism and self-importance from before the mujtahid and the evidences of rulings, smoothing the way to reaching a more ethical ruling.
Machine summary:
The Role of the Rational Virtue of Intellectual Humility in the Process of Deriving Sharia Rulings Mahdieh Takfallah Alireza Alebouyeh Seyyed Mohammad Reza Ayati Abstract Rational virtues in the process of deriving rulings and in the position of belief and issuing fatwas are important issues that jurists and mujtahids must undertake to acquire.
Since the beliefs of the mujtahid play an essential role in ijtihad and the derivation of Sharia rulings, this article examines the role of the rational virtue of "intellectual humility" in the process of deriving Sharia rulings.
Moral Ijtihad, Ethics of Belief, Ethics of Research, Rational Virtues, Intellectual Humility Introduction Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that deals with the boundaries and frontiers of knowledge, or what is known as 'justified true belief.
). In the present discussion, given the suitability of the virtue approach with the teachings of the Quran and Shia hadiths, we have taken the position of the proponents of the third attitude from the perspective of prescriptive epistemology, considering the conditions of acquiring knowledge in ijtihad, and within the scope of the conditions of ijtihad, we have addressed the virtues that make a fatwa a rational and justified jurisprudential belief.
It seems that if we want to consider the ethics of belief as consisting of three types—evidentialist, consequentialist, and virtue-based—then in understanding the believability of jurists, virtue epistemology has played the greatest role regarding many scholars.
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